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INTRODUCTION 
The American Cancer Society recommends that Breast 
self-Exams (BSEs) be performed on a regular monthly basis. 
The recommendation stems from the knowledge that when breast 
cancer is diagnosed at an early stage, the survival rates 
are relatively high (American cancer Society, 1983), and 
further, that a monthly BSE can aid in the early detection 
of malignant breast lumps (e.g., Foster & Costanza, 1984). 
Regardless of the minimum effort required by women to 
perform BSEs (5 minutes per month), very few women adhere to 
the American Cancer Society's recommendation (e.g., Bennett 
et al., 1983). 
What are the sources of resistance by women to perform 
BSEs? Previous research has enumerated several: doing BSE 
requires women to perform an infrequent behavior (e.g., 
Carstensen & O' Grady, 1980; Grady, 1984; Zapka & Mamon, 
1982), to learn to perform a specific skill (e.g., Edwards, 
1980; Hill et al., 1982), and to perform a behavior that, 
due to its private nature, may receive little external 
reinforcement (e.g., Grady, Goodenow & Wolk, 1984). The 
purpose of the present research is to bring light to other 
potential sources of resistance to BSE performance, drawing 
1 
2 
on past relevant research, and especially that from social 
cognition, as a basis for forming plausible and testable 
ideas. More specifically, the present research draws on 
concepts of psychological control and examines how different 
types of messages might affect one's feelings of control. 
Further, the research examines how those feelings of control 
might translate into one's attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviors with respect to breast self-exams. 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) Study 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987), in their attempt to 
understand the resistance to perform breast self-exams, 
proposed that in the short run, BSE is a risky behavior that 
involves uncertain outcomes. Performing BSE does not 
prevent cancer; it detects cancer (Leventhal & Watts, 1966). 
In their study, Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) invoke the 
framing postulate of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, 1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) prospect theory to predict 
decisions to perform BSE. The framing postulate proposes 
that people encode information relevant to risky decisions 
in terms of potential gains or potential losses with respect 
to some flexible and psychologically determined reference 
point such as health. Because different presentations of 
factually equivalent information are postulated to change 
the location of the reference point, such framing 
manipulations can influence whether people encode 
information as gains or losses. Further, the postulate 
assumes that losses, which in their absolute value are 
equivalent to gains, are weighted more heavily in 
3 
4 
peoples' minds. Thus, the postulate, by assuming that 
greater emphasis is attributed to losses and that framing 
manipulations affect whether outcomes are encoded as gains 
or losses, predicts that risky behavioral choices will be 
more likely when information is framed in terms of the 
losses associated with behavioral choices. Invoking the 
framing postulate in their study, Meyerowitz and Chaiken 
(1987) tested the hypothesis that a pamphlet promoting BSE 
compliance would be more effective if it contained strong 
arguments stressing the negative consequences of not 
performing BSE rather than equally strong arguments 
stressing the positive consequences of performing BSE, their 
assumption being that performing BSE is perceived by women 
to be a risky behavior. 
Finding support for their hypothesis, the authors 
attempt to rule out three alternative explanations for their 
findings that they had anticipated. The first alternative 
explanation is the negativity bias effect in person 
perception and decision-making research--the finding that 
negative information exerts a greater judgmental impact than 
objectively equivalent positive information (e.g., 
Anderson, 1965; Birnbaum, 1972; Fiske, 1980; Slovic & 
Lichenstein, 1968). In other words, negative information is 
weighted more heavily because it is perceptually more 
salient or vivid to people who view the world as basically 
positive (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Sears & Whitney, 1972). 
5 
The second alternative explanation is that negative 
information is confounded by its fearful content. In fact, 
research investigating fear appeals has generally found that 
high-fear (negative) messages are more persuasive than low-
fear (positive) messages (e.g., Higbee, 1969; Leventhal, 
1970; and Sutton, 1982). 
Whether or not Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) 
successfully ruled out the first two alternative 
explanations for their findings is debatable for two 
reasons. First, the measures they used to detect negativity 
bias and fear arousal in the first posttest were not used 
again in the second posttest. Second, Meyerowitz and 
Chaiken (1987) asked subjects to recall the content of their 
respective messages, a measure that may not have elicited 
the types of cognitive responses capable of revealing the 
possible influence of the negativity bias and fear arousal 
on subsequent attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. 
Numerous studies have supported the notion that cognitive 
responses, or units of information pertaining to an object 
or issue that are the result of cognitive processing 
(Cacioppo et al., 1981) can, in fact, mediate attitude 
change, and under certain conditions, can also mediate 
behavior change. 
What kinds of cognitive responses might mediate such 
attitude and behavior change? Classification of cognitive 
responses (Cacioppo et al., 1981) in past research has 
6 
yielded three response dimensions: 1) polarity, or the 
degree to which the response is in favor of or opposed to 
the advocacy; 2) origin, or the primary source of the 
information contained in the subject's response; and 3) 
target, or the focus at which the response is directed. In 
addition to those dimensions, the dimensions of saliency 
(how often the cognitive response is elicited) and 
processing mode (emotionality of the response) could provide 
great insight into potentially mediating variables of 
subjects' subsequent attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. 
For example, in the context of Meyerowitz and Chaiken•s 
(1987) study, would subjects in the loss-framed condition 
have mentioned negative information more than subjects in 
the gain-framed condition would have mentioned positive 
information? Similarly, would subjects in the loss-framed 
condition have expressed greater fear elicited by their 
messages than subjects in the gain-framed condition? 
Answers to such questions cannot be ascertained given the 
procedure Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) used to elicit the 
above types of responses. 
The third explanation Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) 
explore is that the framing manipulation might affect 
women's BSE attitudes and behavior via its influence on one 
or more variables given importance as predictors of health 
behavior within protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 
1983; Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) and the related health belief 
7 
model (Becker, 1974; Becker & Maiman, 1975). Those 
variables are perceived severity of breast cancer, perceived 
susceptibility to breast cancer, perceived efficacy of BSE 
as a coping response, and perceived self-efficacy in 
performing BSE. Only the last was found to differentiate 
between the women in the loss- and gain-framed information 
groups in their study. 
Personal Control as a Mediating Variable 
For some reason, women exposed to the loss-framed 
information did adhere to the American Cancer Society's 
recommendation that BSEs be performed monthly more than did 
the women exposed to the gain-framed information. What 
process, if not fear arousal, salience, or those variables 
discussed by the protection motivation theory, might underly 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) potentially fruitful 
finding? With the exception of prospect theory's implicit 
assumption that a loss (vs. gain) frame increases motivation 
for risk-seeking behavior, most prior research on positive 
vs. negative appeals provides little insight into the 
cognitive and affective mechanisms that might underly the 
greater persuasiveness of a loss-framed message. 
In the only past persuasion study explicitly guided by 
prospect theory's framing postulate, Yates (1982) studied 
consumers' decisions to purchase energy-saving devices for 
their homes. She found that a negatively (vs. positively) 
framed message enhanced persuasiom, but only when the 
message advocated a low- (vs. highl-) cost energy device. 
common sense would allow for such a finding--obvious1y, no 
one wants to pay a large sum of m(l)ney, regardless of the 
negativity associated with not paring such a sum. However, 
in the long run, such a purchase 'Wfould pay off. What then, 
is the source of resistance to engraging in a high-cost 
behavior when, in the long run, swch a behavior would yield 
savings? What would be the result- of a study that 
manipulated both a loss- and gain-·framed message along with 
a high- and low-cost message? The.se questions and their 
non-empirically based answers sugg·ested to me that 
underlying the behavior, in both economic and health 
domains, could be the construct of psychological control. 
Some have argued that person.al control is integral to 
self-concept and self-esteem, cons-tituting a fundamental 
psychological need (Bandura, 1977; de Charms, 1968; 
Fenichel, 1945; Hendrick, 1942; R. W. White, 1959). In the 
8 
last few years, researchers have beegun to examine locus of 
control in the context of heal th attti tudes and behaviors. 
Scale development has been one avemue of research. One 
scale developed by Lau-ware (1982) is the multidimensional 
Heal th Locus of Control scale. Thee scale contains four 
subscales: self-control over healtl:h (beliefs in the efficacy 
of self-care), provider-control over health (beliefs in the 
efficacy of doctors), chance health outcomes, and general 
9 
health threat. Another scale developed by Wallston, 
wa11ston, and DeVellis (1978) includes the first three 
dimensions of Lau-Ware's (1982) scale. Finally, Krantz, 
Baum, and Wideman (1980) developed the Health Opinion Survey 
in order to assess attitudes towards self-directed or 
informal treatment. 
Clearly, control is a construct given great attention 
in the health field. In stress research, the effects of 
providing subjects with information and magnifying 
participation and choice have been examined in terms of the 
concept of personal control (e.g., Averill, 1973; Langer & 
Rodin, 1976). Magnified participation and choice often lead 
to increases in perceived control, since they may provide 
subjects with the belief that they can affect their health 
outcomes. Further, information has been thought of as a 
form of cognitive control as it may increase the ability to 
prepare for aversive events and often results in the 
cognitive interpretation of events so that threat is 
lessened (Averill, 1973; Seligman, 1975). 
Outside.of stress research, internal locus of control 
has been linked to knowledge about disease (Seeman & Evans, 
1962; B. Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, & Maides, 1976), 
ability to stop smoking (Coan, 1973; James, Woodruff, & 
Werner, 1965; Kaplan & Cowles, 1978; Mlott & Mlott, 1975; 
Steffy, Meichenbaum, & Best, 1970; Straits & Sechrest, 1963; 
Williams, 1973), ability to lose weight (B. Wallston et al., 
10 
1976), following medical regimens (Lewis, Morisky, & Flynn, 
197s), effective use of birth control (MacDonald, 1970), and 
getting preventive inoculations (Dabbs & Kirscht, 1971). 
Given the importance of health locus of control (HLC) 
beliefs, researchers have begun to address the question of 
their origins. Rotter (1975), discussing general locus of 
control, suggests that these beliefs develop from specific 
experiences and past reinforcement history. In other words, 
people who have experiences or have been reinforced for 
successful control attempts in the past have greater belief 
in personal control than those people unsuccessful in their 
attempts for control. 
Although this origin seems a likely one for 
determining peoples' HLC beliefs, I would expect that the 
nature of the disease itself would also play a role in such 
determination. The remainder of the introduction will 
examine the perceptions among women of breast cancer and BSE 
and, further, how different messages might affect such 
perceptions. 
Hypotheses 
Breast cancer is perceived by most women to be an 
event not within their control: you can detect it, not 
prevent it. How would loss- and gain-framed information 
associated with low- and high-cost behavior affect such 
perceptions? Further, how would such perceptions affect 
h . ? subsequent be avior. 
11 
women confronted with a loss-framed, low-cost message 
are implicitly being told that they do not have control over 
getting cancer, but that they do have control over 
minimizing its effects. I would expect women exposed to 
such messages to experience reactance, a response to loss of 
control that is most likely to occur when existing or 
expected control is arbitrarily threatened or withdrawn (J. 
w. Brehm, 1966; s. s. Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wortman & Brehm, 
1975). Reactance will be greater the stronger one's 
expectation of freedom, the greater the threat, the greater 
the importance of the event, and the stronger the 
implication for other freedoms (J. W. Brehm, 1966; Wicklund, 
1974). In the context of Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) 
study, then, women exposed to loss-framed messages may have 
performed BSEs to ensure that they have control over the 
outcome of breast cancer, as their messages imply. 
Certainly, the loss-framed messages threatened greatly their 
freedom to live, and having breast cancer would deny them 
other freedoms. 
How would women in Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) 
study have reacted to the loss-framed message if they had 
been told that performing BSE would entail a great amount of 
effort and time (a high-cost behavior)? Although women in 
this condition are implicitly told that they can control 
(minimize) the effects of breast cancer, such control can 
12 
only be achieved at a great cost. I would hypothesize that 
helplessness, or the near opposite to reactance, would be 
these women's experience. Instead of responding with 
efforts to restore lost freedoms, the women would probably 
give in and fail to make any effort to change their 
seemingly hopeless situation. In other words, these women 
would probably perceive breast cancer to be an event they 
could not control, and as such, would perform BSE less often 
(if at all). Initially, however, these women would probably 
feel that they did have control over breast cancer, as 
helplessness is often preceded by a short period of 
reactance. 
Women exposed to gain-framed messages in Meyerowitz 
and Chaiken's (1987) study were implicitly told that breast 
cancer was an event whose effects they could minimize with 
minimum effort. Possibly, however, women in this condition 
were unintentionally given the illusion of control, the 
exaggeration of the degree of control one has in situations 
that are actually controlled by chance or other 
uncontrollable forces (Langer, 1975). Initially perceiving 
breast cancer to be an event determined by external control, 
the positive, gain-framed message may have acted to make 
women in this condition perceive breast cancer not only as 
an event determined by them, but also to perceive their own 
involvement in detecting breast cancer as not necessary in 
light of their illusion of control. Women exposed to gain-
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framed messages requiring high-cost behavior might also 
initially gain an illusion of control, but because of the 
greater effort needed to prevent breast cancer, I would 
expect that these women, in the long run, would perceive 
breast cancer to be an event determined by external forces. 
This expectation draws on the notion that a high-cost 
behavior may serve to elicit a helplessness response. 
Immediately after receiving a gain- or loss-framed 
message, regardless of cost, I would expect all women, 
regardless of condition, to have positive attitudes towards 
BSE, albeit for different reasons (See Table 1 for an 
outline of the study hypotheses). Those women in the loss 
conditions would have more positive attitudes due to 
reactance to their messages. Those women in the gain 
conditions would have more positive attitudes due to the 
illusion of control instilled by their messages. Similarly, 
I would expect all women, immediately after the 
intervention, to have equally positive and great intentions 
of performing BSE. 
At a follow-up, I would expect those women in the 
loss-framed low-cost message condition to have the most 
positive attitudes towards, the greatest intentions of 
performing, and to have actually performed BSEs most often, 
followed by those women in the gain-framed low-cost message 
condition, followed by those women in the gain-framed high-
cost message condition, followed by those women in the loss-
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framed high-cost message condition. More concisely, I would 
expect an interaction, such that depending on the cost 
inherent in a message, the loss and gain frames would yield 
different implications for womens' attitudes towards, 
intentions of performing, and performance of BSEs. 
Finally, with respect to perceived self-efficacy in 
performing BSE, I would expect that all women would 
initially be equal in their perceived self-efficacy, but for 
different reasons, reasons thqt could be elicited by 
specific probing of cognitive responses. Those women in the 
loss-framed message conditions might perceive self-efficacy 
due to reactance (i.e., in order to combat their seemingly 
arbitrary loss of control, they would have to believe that 
they are able to be effective in their performance of BSE), 
whereas those women in the gain-framed message conditions 
might perceive self-efficacy due to their illusion of 
control (i.e., because they do not really believe that they 
are in danger of getting breast cancer, these women do not 
question their ability to perform BSE, and so assume that 
they would be effective in performing BSEs). At a follow-
up, however, I would expect that women in the low-cost 
conditions would perceive more self-efficacy than women in 
the high-cost conditions, and that women in the loss-framed 
low-cost condition would perceive the greatest self-
efficacy. The last expectation assumes that women in the 
loss-framed low-cost condition not only view BSE as 
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something they are able to control because of its low cost, 
but also reflects their actually having performed BSE, 
serving to reconfirm their perceived self-efficacy. 
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Table 1. Hypotheses at Posttests 1 and 2 as a function of 
condition. 
condition 
Loss-framed, 
Low-cost 
(LFLC) 
OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES 
Time 1 
--high reactance 
--low illusion 
of control 
--low 
helplessness 
--positive attitudes 
--great intentions 
--high self-efficacy 
Time 2 
--high 
reactance 
--low illusion 
of control 
--low 
helplessness 
--most positive 
attitudes 
--greatest 
intentions 
--perform BSE 
most 
--highest self-
efficacy 
condition 
Loss-framed, 
High-cost 
(LFHC) 
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OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES, CONT'D. 
Time 1 
--high reactance 
--low illusion 
of control 
--low 
helplessness 
--positive attitudes 
--great intentions 
--high self-efficacy 
Time 2 
--low reactance 
--low illusion 
of control 
--high 
helplessness 
--least 
positive 
attitudes 
--least great 
intentions 
--perform BSE 
least often 
--lower self-
efficacy than 
LFLC group 
condition 
Gain-framed, 
Low-cost 
(GFLC) 
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OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES, CONT'D. 
Time 1 
--low reactance 
--low 
helplessness 
--high illusion 
of control 
--positive attitudes 
--great intentions 
--high self-efficacy 
Time 2 
--low reactance 
--low 
helplessness 
--high illusion 
of control 
--2nd most 
positive 
attitudes 
--2nd greatest 
intentions 
--perform BSE 
2nd most 
often 
--2nd highest 
self-efficacy 
condition 
Gain-framed, 
High-cost 
(GFHC) 
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OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES, CONT'D. 
Time 1 
--low reactance 
--high illusion 
of control 
--low 
helplessness 
--positive attitudes 
--great intentions 
--high self-efficacy 
Time 2 
--low reactance 
--low illusion 
of control 
--high 
helplessness 
--2nd least 
positive 
attitudes 
--2nd least 
great 
intentions 
--perform BSE 
2nd least 
often 
--lower self-
efficacy than 
LC groups 
PILOT TESTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The pilot tests were conducted for six primary 
reasons. The first concerned the attempt of the researcher 
to become alert to and correct any problems that might arise 
during the course of the main study. The second reason was 
to find the best means for categorizing the types of 
cognitive responses that might occur and to analyze their 
potential effect on subsequent attitudes and intentions. 
The third reason concerned testing the reliabilities of the 
three measures underlying the study's central hypotheses. 
Because there were no current measures of reactance, 
illusion of control, and helplessness, the experimenter 
created her own measures based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of those psychological concepts. The fourth 
reason concerned manipulation checks of the four different 
messages. The two questions of primary interest were 1) How 
much time and effort are required to perform BSE?, and 2) 
What are the benefits (costs) associated with performing 
(not performing) BSE?. The fifth reason was to gain an 
understanding of what women's attitudes towards BSE was 
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prior to the study. As such, a pretest was administered in 
which womens' attitudes towards BSE and other health 
practices were ascertained. Finally, the sixth reason 
concerned an attempt to determine whether or not the pilot 
test results were in the direction of supporting the study 
hypotheses. Although only one pilot test was planned at the 
outset, the second one was conducted as it became clear that 
some changes in the first should be made before conducting 
the main study. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Fifty-four Loyola undergraduate women enrolled in 
introductory psychology participated in the first pilot test 
to fulfill a course requirement. Thirty Loyola 
undergraduate women recruited on campus participated in the 
second pilot test. Each subject was randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions, conditions comprising a 2 X 2 
design. Those conditions were as follows: a loss-framed, 
low-cost message condition; a loss-framed, high-cost message 
condition; a gain-framed, low-cost message condition; and a 
gain-framed, high-cost message condition. 
Materials 
The pamphlet and measures administered to subjects 
were of the same format as those administered to subjects in 
the main study {See Pilot Tests Procedure section for 
measures used). 
Procedure 
The women in each condition were told that the 
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materials they received constituted a "health attitudes" 
study, and that the study concentrated on breast cancer and 
breast self-examination. Prior to receiving the pamphlets, 
subjects received a brief "health attitudes" questionnaire. 
Immediately after receiving the pamphlets, subjects 
received the following measures administered in a random 
order so as to prevent confounding due to one specific order 
(See APPENDIX B for actual measures): 
1) questions related to the variables accorded 
importance as predictors of health behavior within 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983; 
Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) and the related health 
belief model (Becker, 1974; Becker & Maiman, 
1975). Specifically, those variables are: 
A) perceived susceptibility to breast 
cancer; 
B) perceived severity of breast cancer; 
C) beliefs in BSE's efficacy; and 
D) perceived self-efficacy in performing 
BSE.; 
2) measures of belief salience and emotional 
responses evoked by the messages, obtained by 
asking subjects to write down all thoughts that 
occurred to them during their respective messages; 
3) recall of the correct procedures for perf,orming 
BSEs and of the arguments contained in the 
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pamphlets; 
4) Wallston et al. (1978) Multidimensional Health 
Locus of Control (MHLC) scale; 
5) measures of reactance, helplessness, and 
illusion of control; 
6) measures of attitudes towards BSE; and 
7) measure of intentions of performing BSE. 
After completing the measures, subjects were thanked 
for participating, and were told that further information 
would be sent to them upon request at the completion of the 
study. 
PILOT TEST RESULTS 
The six reasons for conducting a pilot study will be 
discussed individually with respect to the results. 
Furthermore, because two pilot studies were conducted, the 
results will be discussed for the two studies separately. 
Unforeseen Problems 
The first reason for conducting the pilot tests 
concerned an attempt to ascertain that no unforeseen 
problems would arise in the main study. Two minor problems 
did arise. First, some subjects thought that reading the 
pamphlet was the only task requested of them. To make the 
subjects aware of the questionnaire following the pamphlet, 
the experimenter informed subjects of such. Specifically, 
while handing out the pamphlets, the experimenter told 
subjects, "You will be receiving a questionnaire after you 
have finished reading this pamphlet." Besides making 
subjects aware of their required tasks, the aim of such 
clarification reflected the experimenter's hope that 
subjects would process the pamphlet contents in a thoughtful 
manner. Presumably as a result of the experimenter's added 
instructions, this problem did not arise during the second 
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pilot study. 
The second problem arose via an inspection of pamphlet 
contents. The experimenter noted that four of the 
statements, constant in all of the pamphlets, might lead to 
a confounding of conditions. The first such statement was 
on the page entitled, "Basic Facts," and read: "Today, 
breast cancer can be found at the earliest possible stage 
when chances for cure are nearly 100 percent." The 
experimenter felt that this statement might promote an 
illusion of control, and as such, might lower the strength 
of the two loss-framed conditions. The other three 
statements were on the page entitled, "How To Do BSE, 11 and 
read, in turn, "Women with small breasts will need at least 
2 minutes to examine each breast ••• Larger breasts will take 
longer ••• Choose the method easiest for you." The 
experimenter felt that these statements may confuse subjects 
as to the actual time and effort involved in doing BSE, 
especially those subjects in the two "high-cost" conditions. 
Due to these possible confounds, the experimenter replaced 
the first statement with the following, "The American Cancer 
Society recommends that all women perform breast self-exams 
(BSEs). 11 The last three statements were erased from the 
pamphlet. The second pilot test employed the revised 
pamphlet. 
Cognitive Response Categorization/Analysis 
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The second reason for conducting the pilot tests was 
to find the best means for categorizing the types of 
cognitive responses that occurred and to analyze their 
potential effect on attitudes and intentions. Two ways of 
categorizing the cognitive responses were decided on by 
examining the responses of subjects in the first pilot 
study. The first concerned the favorability of the 
responses and the categories were, "favorable," 
"unfavorable," and "neutral." The second concerned the 
source of the responses and the categories were, "message," 
"issue," and "message and issue." All of the above 
categories encompassed fully the types of cognitive 
responses made by subjects and were used again for the 
second pilot test results. Due to the possible confounding 
of conditions in the first pilot test (N=54) and to the 
small number of subjects {N=30) in the second pilot test, 
the experimenter did not categorize the cognitive responses 
with respect to the study hypotheses, i.e., in terms of 
reactance, helplessness, and illusion of control. such 
categorization was done during the main study. 
In an attempt to ascertain what, if any, relationships 
existed between the cognitive responses and subsequent 
attitudes and intentions, two chi-square analyses and two 
one-way ANOVAS were performed. The first chi-square 
examined the effects of the frame and cost manipulations on 
the favorability of cognitive responses, those responses 
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having been coded categorically. Cognitive responses were 
coded as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral. The number of 
people in the two pilot studies who had favorable, 
unfavorable, or neutral responses are shown in Appendix A, 
Table 9. Neither analyzing the two pilot tests' data 
separately nor jointly yielded significant differences among 
the conditions. It appears as though the frame and cost 
manipulations had no effect on the favorability of cognitive 
responses. 
The second chi-square examined the effects of the 
frame and cost manipulations on the source of cognitive 
responses, those responses having been coded categorically. 
Cognitive responses were coded as message, issue, or message 
and issue. The number of people in the two pilot tests who 
gave "message," "issue," or "message and issue" responses 
are shown in Appendix A, Table 10. Neither analyzing the 
two pilot tests' data separately nor jointly yielded 
significant differences among the conditions. It appears as 
though the frame and cost manipulations had no effect on the 
source of cognitive responses. 
The first ANOVA examined the effects of the 
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE 
attitudes. Combining the data from the two pilot tests, 
those subjects with favorable cognitive responses were 
marginally significantly more likely to have more positive 
attitudes than were those subjects with unfavorable or 
neutral cognitive responses [(main effect, Favorability: 
F=2.61, (2,69), p5.08l); See mean scores in Appendix A, 
Table 11]. This exploratory analysis, then, suggests that 
favorable BSE cognitive responses may be capable of 
predicting favorable BSE attitudes. 
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The second ANOVA examined the effects of the 
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE 
intentions. There was no significant difference or trend 
among conditions, combining data for the two pilot tests 
[(2-way interaction: F=.961, (2,69), p5.387); see Appendix A 
Table 12 for mean scores], indicating that favorability and 
source of cognitive responses had no effect on BSE 
intentions. There were few significant differences when 
examining the effects of cognitive responses, and even those 
differences should be interpreted with caution due to the 
unreliability of those differences across pretests, the 
marginality of some of the significant differences, and the 
small number of subjects in the second pilot test 
especially. 
Accuracy of Measures 
The third reason for conducting the pilot tests was to 
test the reliabilities of the measures, especially those of 
reactance, illusion of control, and helplessness. One of 
the BSE efficacy items was not significantly related to the 
other two (r=-.03, P=.43), and hence was dropped for the 
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second pilot test. The two self-efficacy items were 
significantly related (r=.41, P=.001) to each other. The 
subscales of the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control 
scale were reliable ("Internal" subscale (alpha=.73); 
"Powerful Others" subscale (alpha=.79); and "Chance" 
subscale (alpha=.70)). The BSE Attitudes index was reliable 
at the first pilot test (alpha=.94). Four items were added 
to the index at the second pilot test and items were revised 
to allow for more extreme attitudes as almost all subjects 
during the first pilot test expressed highly positive 
attitudes. The revised BSE Attitudes index, used at the 
second pilot test, was reliable (alpha=.92). One item was 
not related highly to the other items, however (corrected 
item-total correlation=.17), and so was not included in the 
main study. The first reactance index (there are two 
reactance indices, the first measuring threatened freedoms 
and the second measuring available options) was reliable at 
the first pilot test (alpha=.75) and at the second pilot 
test (alpha=.88). The second reactance index was also 
reliable at the first pilot test (alpha=.72). Because the 
filler items seemed to promote a response bias towards the 
upper end of the scale, however, they were deleted from the 
questionnaire at the second pilot test. The revised second 
reactance index was reliable at the second pilot test 
(alpha=.74). At the first pilot test, the reliability of 
the illusion of control index increased with the inclusion 
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of the filler items (alpha=.82). Due to this inappropriate 
increase in reliability, the filler items were made more 
obviously true at the second pilot test. At the second 
pilot test, the reliability of the illusion of control index 
was not high with the fillers (alpha=.47) but without the 
fillers, the reliability increased (alpha=.61). 
Manipulation Checks 
The fourth reason for conducting the pilot tests was 
to perform manipulation checks on the four different 
messages. Manipulation checks were done only at the first 
pilot test as the manipulations, checked by subjects' 
pamphlet argument recall, were successful. Subjects in the 
gain-framed conditions reported arguments in gain language 
(i.e., stressed the positive consequences associated with 
performing BSE) significantly more often than did subjects 
in the loss-framed conditions [(main effect, Frame: F=24.07, 
(1,50), p~.0001); see Appendix A, Table 13 for mean scores]. 
There was, however, a main effect for cost, such that 
subjects in the low-cost conditions reported arguments in 
gain language significantly more often than did subjects in 
the high-cost conditions (main effect, Cost: F=4.81, (1,50), 
p~.030), giving rise to the possibility that the higher 
reporting of gain-framed arguments by subjects in gain-
framed conditions might be confounded by the also higher 
reporting of gain-framed arguments by subjects in low-cost 
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conditions. Subjects in the loss-framed conditions reported 
arguments in loss language (i.e., stressed the negative 
consequences associated with not performing BSE) 
significantly more often than did subjects in the gain-
framed conditions [(main effect, Frame: F=14.35, (1,50), 
p5.000l); see Appendix A, Table 14 for mean scores]. Again, 
however, there was a main effect for cost, such that 
subjects in the high-cost conditions reported arguments in 
loss language significantly more often than did subjects in 
the low-cost conditions (main effect, Cost: F=4.09, (1,50), 
p5.048), giving rise to the possibility that the higher 
reporting of loss-framed arguments by subjects in loss-
framed conditions might be confounded by the also higher 
reporting of loss-framed arguments by subjects in high-cost 
conditions. Finally, subjects in the low-cost conditions 
reported arguments in terms of low-cost (with respect to 
time and effort involved in performing BSE) significantly 
more often than did subjects in the high-cost conditions 
[(F=2.72, (1,50), p5.105); See Appendix A, Table 15 for mean 
scores]. The marginal significance of this main effect was 
due to a two-way interaction, subjects in the loss-framed, 
low-cost condition being most likely to report arguments in 
terms of low cost (F=5.309, (1,50), p5.025). Virtually no 
subjects reported arguments in terms of high cost, so the 
experimenter added one "cost" argument to pamphlets to be 
used in the main study so as to help ensure that the cost 
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manipulation would be more explicitly effective. 
Prior Attitudes 
The fifth reason for conducting the pilot tests was to 
ascertain what women's attitudes towards BSE were prior to 
the experiment. The two questions of interest were 1) "How 
enjoyable is it to perform BSE?" (response options ranging 
from 11 1 11 to 11 7," 11 1 11 being "unenjoyable" and 11 7 11 being 
"enjoyable") and 2) "How beneficial is it to perform BSE?" 
(response options ranging from 11 1 11 to 11 7," 11 1 11 being 
"harmful" and 11 7 11 being "beneficial"). The experimenter 
believed that although most women would perceive BSE to be a 
beneficial act, most women would probably simultaneously 
perceive BSE to be an either neutral or slightly unenjoyable 
act. In fact, most women did perceive BSE to be beneficial 
(X=6.60, N=54) but not very enjoyable (X=3.46, N=54). Such 
prior attitudes were important to ascertain with respect to 
the balance attempted in the manipulation. That is to say, 
in constructing the manipulation, the assumption was made 
that most women perceived BSE to be slightly unenjoyable. 
Another reason for assessing women's prior attitudes towards 
BSE was to inspect whether or not such attitudes would have 
an effect on post-experimental attitudes. Two ANCOVAS were 
performed on post-experimental attitudes using prior 
attitudes as covariates. The prior attitudes were treated 
independently as the "beneficiality" and "enjoyability" 
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pretest attitude scores were not significantly related to 
each other (r=.051, p=.356). The covariates had no effect 
on the significance of post-experimental attitudes, lending 
support to the conclusion that prior attitudes had no effect 
on post-experimental attitudes towards BSE. Because the 
above results with respect to prior attitudes were 
conclusive, this measure was not used again at the second 
pilot test. 
Study Hypotheses 
The sixth reason for conducting the pilot tests was to 
observe whether or not the results were in the direction of 
supporting the study hypotheses. Of special import were the 
post-experimental attitudes and intentions across the four 
experimental conditions. In the first pilot study, there 
was no significant difference among women in the four 
experimental conditions with respect to attitudes [(two-way 
interaction: F=.634, (1,50), P=.430); see Appendix A, Table 
16 for mean scores]. Also in the first pilot test, there 
was a main effect of cost on women's intentions of 
performing BSE, those women in the low-cost conditions 
having greater intentions of performing BSE than women in 
the high-cost conditions [(main effect, Cost: F=4.27, 
(1,50), P=.044); see Appendix A, Table 17 for mean scores]. 
Because it was believed that the manipulation might have 
been confounded (as discussed earlier) by other pamphlet 
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contents, changes were made in the pamphlets so as to elicit 
a greater difference in attitudes and intentions across 
conditions. In the second pilot test, there was a 
marginally significant difference among women across 
conditions with respect to attitudes, women in the loss-
framed conditions holding more positive attitudes towards 
BSE than women in the gain-framed conditions [(main effect, 
Frame: F=J.18, (1,26), P=.086); see Appendix A, Table 18 for 
mean scores). Also in the second pilot test, however, there 
was no significant difference among women in the four 
conditions with respect to intentions [(two-way interaction: 
F=.297, (1,26), P=.590); see Appendix A, Table 19 for the 
mean scores). 
Combining the data from the two pilot tests, there was 
no significant difference among women across conditions with 
respect to attitudes [(two-way interaction: F=.48, (1,80), 
p~.489; see Appendix A, Table 20 for mean scores). This 
result should be interpreted with great caution as the 
Attitude index items used for analysis and the study 
materials in general were not identical for the two pilot 
tests. Also in combining the data from the two pilot tests, 
there was no significant difference among women across 
conditions with respect to intentions [(two-way interaction: 
F=.215, (1,80), p~.644); see Appendix A, Table 21 for mean 
scores). Again, this result should be interpreted with 
caution as the study materials were not identical for the 
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two pilot tests. 
In order to make the manipulations stronger, two 
ngain-loss frame" arguments and one "low-high cost" argument 
were added to the pamphlet in the main study. Although the 
second pilot test yielded results only partially supportive 
of the study hypotheses in terms of expected attitudes and 
intentions, it should be noted that differences in attitudes 
and intentions across conditions were expected not at the 
immediate posttest, but mainly at a follow-up. 
MAIN STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
Having learned from the two pilot tests, the 
experimenter felt ready to conduct the main study. The main 
study was very similar to the pilot tests in intent and in 
procedure. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
One hundred-twenty Loyola undergraduate women, some 
enrolled in introductory psychology and some recruited on 
campus, participated in the study. Each subject was 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions, comprising a 2 
X 2 design. The conditions were as follows: a loss-framed, 
low-cost message condition; a loss-framed, high-cost message 
condition; a gain-framed, low-cost message condition; and a 
gain-framed, high-cost message condition. 
Materials 
The pamphlets administered to subjects were similar to 
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those distributed by the American Cancer Society (ACS) and 
the National Cancer Institute (NCI). Following the example 
of Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) study, pages 1, 3, and 4 
were identical for subjects in the four pamphlet conditions. 
page 1, titled, "Basic Facts," included the ACS's 
recommendation that all women perform monthly BSEs and 
information about the prevalence of breast cancer. Pages 3 
and 4 presented information describing when and how to do 
BSE. 
Page 2 differed for the four pamphlet conditions. For 
gain- and loss-frame subjects, this page contained six 
arguments supporting the importance of performing BSE. 
Although factually equivalent, these arguments were framed 
in terms of either the positive consequences of doing BSE 
(gain conditions) or the negative consequences of not doing 
BSE (loss conditions). For low- and high-cost subjects, 
this page contained four additional statements indicating 
the amount of effort and time needed to perform BSE. For 
the low-cost subjects, these statements stressed the 
minimal time and effort required of women in performing BSE. 
For the high-cost subjects, these statements stressed a 
somewhat greater amount of time and effort required by women 
than was stressed for the low-cost subjects. (See Appendix 
C for "Page 2" for the different conditions). The pamphlet 
arguments were presented in the same order for all subjects. 
Measures were administered at two times after the 
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pamphlets were administered. 
Procedure 
women in each condition were told that the materials 
they received constituted a "health attitudes" study, and 
that the study was meant to concentrate on breast cancer and 
breast self-examination. 
Prior to receiving the pamphlets, subjects received a 
pretest embedded with questions related to their attitudes 
towards performing BSEs (See APPENDIX B for study measures). 
Immediately after receiving the pamphlets and at a three-
month follow-up, subjects in the four pamphlet conditions 
received the study measures listed in the Pilot Tests 
Procedure section. In addition to those measures, at a 
follow-up, subjects were asked about their performance of 
BSE. It should be noted that although the substantive 
content of the questionnaires received by subjects at the 
two posttests was the same, there were subtle differences in 
wording due to the nature of the posttests (the first 
required self-administered interviews and the second 
required telephone interviews). 
The primary intent of the second measure (see Pilot 
Tests Procedure section), the cognitive responses, was to 
investigate the influence of cognitive responses as a 
mediating variable on subjects' subsequent attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors. That is, did the condition to 
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which one was assigned determine in part a subject's 
cognitive responses, and did those responses determine in 
part a subject's subsequent attitudes, intentions, and 
behaviors? A secondary intent of this measure's use was to 
note whether or not subjects• responses provided support for 
the experimenter's hypotheses. For example, at the first 
posttest, a response similar to "I've got too many things to 
live for," might have been a sign of reactance, as a 
response similar to "I have nothing to worry about," might 
have been a sign of an illusion of control. At follow-up, a 
response similar to" I can't do anything to offset breast 
cancer" might have been a sign of helplessness. 
After the subjects completed the questionnaires, they 
were thanked for taking part in the study and were 
encouraged to ask any questions they might have. Further, 
the subjects were told that they would be given more 
information about the study after the follow-up. 
At the follow-up, subjects were contacted by telephone 
to ensure their convenience. To maximize response rate, 
subjects were told at the first posttest that they would be 
called in about eight weeks. The response rate at the 
follow-up was 88% (98/112) and the dropout rate was not 
significantly different across conditions (4-LFLC; 2-GFLC; 
4-LFHC; and 4-GFHC). The follow-up included the exact 
measures included at the first posttest. 
After completing the follow-up, subjects were 
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debriefed. They were told, specifically, that the study's 
purpose was to assess the effects of gain- vs. loss-framed 
and low-vs. high-cost messages in the context of BSEs in 
particular, and in the context of health detection measures 
in general. Also, the subjects were told that the results 
of the study would be sent to them upon request. 
Furthermore, they were told that if they had any questions 
or concerns, they should feel free to contact the researcher 
at any time. Finally, the subjects were greatly thanked for 
their contribution to the study in particular and to social 
science in general. 
MAIN STUDY RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
At the first and second posttests, the manipulations, 
as checked by subjects' pamphlet argument recall, were 
successful. Furthermore, there was no evidence of potential 
confounds as there was at the pilot tests. At the first and 
second posttests, subjects in the gain-framed conditions 
reported arguments in gain language statistically 
significantly more often than did subjects in the loss-
framed conditions ((posttest 1 main effect: F=46.229, 
(1,101), p~.0001); (posttest 2 main effect: F=40.385, 
(1,90), p~.0001); see Appendix A, Table 22 for mean scores 
at both posttests]. Likewise, subjects in the loss-framed 
conditions reported arguments in loss language significantly 
more often than did subjects in the gain-framed conditions 
[(posttest 1 main effect: F=31.360, (1,101), p~.0001); 
(posttest 2 main effect: F=77.614, (1,90), p~.0001); see 
Appendix A, Table 23 for mean scores at both posttests]. 
Finally, subjects in the low-cost conditions reported 
arguments in terms of low cost significantly more often than 
did subjects in the high-cost conditions at the first 
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posttest but not at the second posttest [(posttest 1 main 
effect: F=7.554, (1,101), p5.007); (posttest 2 main effect: 
F=l.000, (1,90), p5.320); see Table 24 for mean scores at 
both posttestsJ. As in the first pilot study, no subjects 
reported arguments in terms of high cost at the first or 
second posttests. Noted should be the fact that although 
there was very little incorrect recall (of arguments not 
heard), the correct recall was somewhat low (gain-framed, 
posttest 1: 1.9/6; gain-framed, posttest 2: 1.1/6; loss-
framed, posttest 1: .81/6; loss-framed, posttest 2: .74/6; 
low-cost, posttest 1: .25/6; and low-cost, posttest 2: 
.02/6). Noted also should be the fact that although only 
one person coded the recall of pamphlet arguments, the 
coding was probably not biased given its straightforwardness 
and the blindness of the coder with respect to subject 
conditions. 
Cognitive Responses 
As done in the pilot tests, an attempt was made at 
both posttests to determine what, if any, relationships 
existed between the cognitive responses and subsequent 
attitudes and intentions via two chi-squares and two one-way 
ANOVAs. The first chi-square examined the effects of frame 
and cost manipulations on the favorability of cognitive 
responses. The number of people at each posttest who had 
favorable, unfavorable, or neutral responses are shown in 
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Appendix A, Table 25. Combining the data from both 
posttests, 8% of the women had favorable cognitive 
responses, 6% had unfavorable cognitive responses, and 86% 
had neutral cognitive responses. From the nonsignificance 
of the chi-square, it is evident that the manipulations had 
no effect on the favorability of cognitive responses. In 
fact, the majority of women reported neutral cognitive 
responses. 
The second chi-square examined the effects of the 
frame and cost manipulations on the source of cognitive 
responses. The number of people at each posttest who gave 
"message," "issue," or "message and issue" responses are 
shown in Appendix A, Table 26. Again, combining the data 
from both posttests, 17% of the women gave "message" 
cognitive responses, 70% gave "issue" cognitive responses, 
and 13% gave "message and issue" cognitive responses. From 
the nonsignificance of the chi-square, it is evident that 
the manipulations had no effect on the source of cognitive 
responses. In fact, the majority of women gave "issue" 
cognitive responses. 
The first ANOVA examined the effects of the 
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE 
attitudes. There was no significant difference at either 
posttest across conditions ((posttest 1 two-way interaction: 
F=l.727, (3,87), p~.167); (posttest 2 two-way interaction: 
F=l.816, (3,80), p~.151); see Appendix A, Table 27 for mean 
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scores at both posttests], indicating that favorability and 
source of cognitive responses had no effect on BSE 
attitudes. These results should be interpreted with caution 
as there were very small numbers of people who gave 
favorable and unfavorable responses. 
The second ANOVA examined the effects of the 
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE 
intentions. There was no significant difference at either 
posttest across conditions [(posttest 1 two-way interaction: 
F=.938, (3,92), p5.426); (posttest 2 two-way interaction: 
F=l.023, (3,80), p5.387); see Appendix A, Table 28 for mean 
scores at both posttests], indicating that favorability and 
source had no effect on BSE intentions. Again, these 
results should be interpreted with caution as there were 
very small numbers of people who gave favorable and 
unfavorable responses. 
Attitudes 
At the first posttest, there was no statistically 
significant difference across the four conditions with 
respect to women's attitudes towards performing breast self-
exams [(two-way interaction: F=l.58, (1, 103), p5.212); see 
Table 2 for mean scores at both posttests]. The mean 
attitude score was, however, relatively high as expected 
(range from 71.73 (5.12/7 per attitude item) for the gain-
framed, low-cost condition to 76.75 (5.46/7 per attitude 
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item) for the loss-framed, low-cost condition out of a 
possible "98.00" total). At the second posttest, there was 
an unexpected statistically significant main effect 
difference (F=7.086, (1,91) p~.009) such that the high-cost 
conditions had more favorable attitudes towards performing 
breast self-exams than did the low-cost conditions, the 
expectation being that the low-cost conditions, and 
especially the loss-framed, low-cost condition, would have 
the most positive attitudes. There also evinced a slight 
"sleeper effect" for all but the loss-framed, low-cost 
condition, this effect being especially present for the 
loss-framed, high-cost condition, such that women in these 
conditions had more positive attitudes at the second 
posttest than they had at the first posttest. 
Table 2. Mean scores of BSE attitudes as a function of 
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2. 
POSTTEST 1 POSTTEST 2 
LOW- HIGH- LOW- HIGH-
COST COST COST COST 
LOSS- 76.75 75.00 75.91 75.04 83.23 78.96 
FRAME N=28 N=26 N=54 N=24 N=22 N=46 
GAIN- 71. 73 75.70 73.75 73.84 78.08 75.92 
FRAME N=26 N=27 N=53 N=25 N=24 N=49 
74.33 75.36 74.43 80.54 
N=54 N=53 N=49 N=46 
Intentions 
At the first posttest, there was no statistically 
significant difference across the four conditions with 
respect to women's intentions of performing breast self-
exams in the future [(2-way interaction: F=.084, (1,108), 
p5.775); see Table 3 for mean scores at both posttests]. 
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The mean intention score was, however, relatively high as 
expected (range from 5.57/7 for the loss-framed, high-cost 
condition to 5.82/7 for the gain-framed, high-cost 
condition). At the second posttest, the main effect for the 
Frame condition was statistically significant (F=4.542, 
p5.04) and the main effect for the Cost condition was 
marginally statistically significant (F=2.844, p5.10), such 
that the gain-framed conditions and the high-cost conditions 
had greater intentions of performing BSEs than did the loss-
framed conditions and the low-cost conditions, respectively. 
Both of these findings were contrary to expectations, those 
being that the low-cost conditions and especially the loss-
framed, low-cost condition would have the greatest 
intentions of performing BSEs. Also, there again evinced a 
slight "sleeper effect" for all but the loss-framed, low-
cost condition, such that women in those three conditions 
had greater intentions of performing BSEs at the second 
posttest. 
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Table 3. Mean scores of BSE intentions as a function of 
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2. 
POSTTEST 1 POSTTEST 2 
LOW- HIGH- LOW- HIGH-
COST COST COST COST 
LOSS- 5.64 5.57 5.61 5.29 5.86 5.56 
FRAME N=28 N=28 N=56 N=24 N=22 N=46 
GAIN- 5.75 5.82 5.79 5.96 6.21 6.08 
FRAME N=28 N=28 N=56 N=25 N=24 N=49 
5.70 5.70 5.63 6.04 
N=56 N=56 N=49 N=46 
In an attempt to better understand the relationship 
between attitudes and intentions at both posttests and also 
to give closer examination to two of the main variables in 
the study, cross-lagged correlations were conducted. All of 
the correlations were greater than .30 and all were 
significant (See Table 4 below for correlations). The 
highest correlations were between Posttest 1 and Posttest 2 
attitudes and between Posttest 1 and Posttest 2 intentions, 
possibly signifying the strong reliabilities of the 
attitudes and intentions measures. Also, the correlation 
between attitudes and intentions was greater at Posttest 2 
than it was at Posttest 1, although the increase is probably 
not a significant one. Finally, the correlation between 
Posttest 1 attitudes and Posttest 2 intentions was slightly 
49 
but not significantly greater than the correlation between 
posttest 1 intentions and Posttest 2 attitudes, such that no 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to one measure's 
scores being causally related to the other measure's scores. 
Table 4. Cross-lagged correlations of Posttest 1 and 
Posttest 2 attitudes and intentions. 
Posttest 1 
attitudes --
1 .390 
I (9o) 
I 
.422 
(107) 
I 
I 
I 
. 304 
I (94) 
intentions --
Note: All r's: p~.0001. 
.597 
(90) 
.589 
(94) 
Posttest 2 
-- -- attitudes 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.540 
(95) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-- -- intentions 
Self-efficacy 
At the first posttest, there was no statistically 
significant difference across the four conditions with 
respect to self-efficacy in performing breast self-exams 
[(two-way interaction: F=.001, (1,106), p~.980); see 
Appendix A, Table 29 for mean scores at both posttests]. 
The mean self-efficacy score was, however, relatively high 
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as expected (range from 10.29 (5.14/7 per self-efficacy 
item) for the loss-framed, low-cost condition to 11.37 
(5.68/7 per self-efficacy item) for the gain-framed, high-
cost condition out of a possible "14.00" total). At the 
second posttest, there was a statistically significant main 
effect difference (F=7.115, (1,91), p~.009) such that the 
high-cost conditions reported a greater sense of self-
efficacy than did the low-cost conditions. This finding was 
contrary to the expectation that the low-cost conditions and 
especially the loss-framed, low-cost group would have the 
highest perceived self-efficacy. Also noteworthy is the 
finding that for all conditions, the self-efficacy scores 
were higher at the second posttest than they were at the 
first posttest. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
Reactance 
Women in the loss-framed conditions were expected to 
experience reactance at the time of the first posttest and 
women in the loss-framed, low-cost condition were expected 
to continue to experience reactance at the second posttest. 
Four measures of reactance will be discussed in turn to 
determine whether or not these expectations were met. 
First, subjects experiencing reactance should have 
given statistically significantly more cognitive responses 
reflecting anger and hostility than subjects not 
experiencing reactance. Virtually no one, however, at 
either posttest, reported such responses. 
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Second, subjects experiencing reactance should have 
had statistically significantly higher scores on the MHLC 
Internal subscale than subjects not experiencing reactance. 
At the first posttest, however, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the gain- and loss-framed 
conditions with respect to these scores [(Frame main effect: 
F=.815, (1,107), p~.369); see Appendix A, Table 30 for mean 
scores at both posttests] and at the second posttest, too, 
there was no statistically significant difference between 
the loss-framed, low-cost condition and the other conditions 
with respect to these scores (two-way interaction: F=.777, 
(1,91), p~.38). 
Third, subjects experiencing reactance should have had 
statistically significantly lower scores on the "Reactance" 
index, Part A (See Appendix B) than subjects not 
experiencing reactance. At the first posttest, however, 
there was no statistically significant difference between 
the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to these 
scores [(Frame main effect: F=.713, (1,103), p~.401); see 
Appendix A, Table 31 for mean scores at both posttests] and 
at the second posttest, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the loss-framed, low-cost 
condition and the other conditions (two-way interaction: 
F= . 2 6 2 , ( 1 , 91) , p~. 610) . 
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Fourth, subjects experiencing reactance should have 
had statistically significantly higher scores on the 
"Reactance" index, Part B (See Appendix B) than subjects not 
experiencing reactance. At the first posttest, however, 
there was no statistically significant difference between 
the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to these 
scores [(Frame main-effect: F=.096, (1,105), p~.758); see 
Appendix A, Table 32 for mean scores at both posttests] and 
at the second posttest, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the loss-framed, low-cost 
condition and the other conditions (two-way interaction: 
F=l.787, (1,91), p~.185). 
Following these individual analyses, an overall 
analysis was performed on the three relevant measures of 
reactance combined. After reverse-scoring the items on the 
"Reactance" index, Part A and transforming the MHLC Internal 
scores, the "Reactance" index, Part A scores, and the 
"Reactance" index, Part B scores to z-scores, correlations 
among the three measures were computed for both posttests 
(See Appendix A, Table 33). Not having full justification 
for combining these three measures into one total 
"Reactance" score based on their intercorrelations, no such 
score was computed and no further analyses were done with 
respect to the Reactance measures. 
Illusion of Control 
Women in the gain-framed conditions were expected to 
experience an illusion of control at the time of the first 
posttest and women in the gain-framed, low-cost condition 
were expected to continue to experience an illusion of 
control at the second posttest. Four measures of an 
illusion of control will be discussed in turn to determine 
whether or not these expectations were met. 
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First, subjects experiencing an illusion of control 
should have given statistically significantly more cognitive 
responses reflecting this process than subjects not 
experiencing an illusion of control. Virtually no one, 
however, at either posttest, reported such responses. 
Second, subjects experiencing an illusion of control 
should have had statistically significantly lower scores on 
the item reflecting breast cancer susceptibility than 
subjects not experiencing an illusion of control. At the 
first posttest, however, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the gain- and loss-framed 
conditions with respect to these scores [(Frame main-effect: 
F=l.038, (1,107), p5.310); see Appendix A, Table 34 for mean 
scores at both posttests] and at the second posttest, there 
was no statistically significant difference between the 
gain-framed, low-cost condition and the other conditions 
(two-way interaction: F=.677, (1,91), p5.413). 
Third, subjects experiencing an illusion of control 
should have had statistically significantly higher scores on 
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the items reflecting BSE efficacy than subjects not 
experiencing an illusion of control. At the first posttest, 
however, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to 
these scores [(Frame main-effect: F=.427, (1,108), p5.515); 
see Appendix A, Table 35 for mean scores at both posttests] 
and at the second posttest, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the gain-framed, low-cost 
condition and the other conditions (two-way interaction: 
F=.620, (1,91), p5.433). 
Fourth, subjects experiencing an illusion of control 
should have had statistically significantly higher scores on 
the "Illusion of Control" index than subjects not 
experiencing an illusion of control. At the first posttest, 
however, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to 
these scores [(Frame main-effect: F=.659, (l,96), p5.419); 
see Appendix A, Table 36 for mean scores at both posttests]. 
At the second posttest, there was a statistically 
significant Cost main effect difference (F=4.670, (1,89), 
p5.033), such that women in the low-cost conditions had 
scores exhibiting a greater degree of an illusion of control 
than did women in the high-cost conditions. The 
expectation, however, was that only women in the gain-
framed, low-cost condition would have higher scores than 
women in other conditions on this index. 
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Following these individual analyses, an overall 
analysis was performed on the three relevant measures of 
illusion of control. After reverse-scoring the item 
reflecting breast cancer susceptibility and transforming 
that item, the items reflecting breast self-exam efficacy, 
and the Illusion of Control index scores to z-scores, 
correlations among the three measures were computed for both 
posttests (See Appendix A, Table 37). Not having full 
justification for combining these three measures into one 
total "Illusion of Control" score based on their 
intercorrelations, no such score was computed and no further 
analyses were done with respect to the Illusion of Control 
measures. As in the Reactance analyses, no analysis lent 
support to the expectation that subjects in the gain-framed 
conditions would experience a greater degree of illusion of 
control at the first posttest or that subjects in the gain-
framed, low-cost conditions would experience a greater 
degree of illusion of control than subjects in the other 
conditions at the second posttest. 
Helplessness 
Women in the high-cost conditions were expected to 
experience helplessness at the time of the second posttest. 
Four measures of helplessness will be discussed in turn to 
determine whether or not these expectations were met. 
First, subjects experiencing helplessness should have 
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given statistically significantly more cognitive responses 
reflecting discouragement and loss of hope than subjects not 
experiencing helplessness. Virtually no one, however, 
reported such responses. 
Second, subjects experiencing helplessness should have 
had statistically significantly lower scores on the MHLC 
Internal subscale than subjects not experiencing 
helplessness. At the second posttest, however, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the high- and 
low-cost conditions with respect to these scores [(Cost main 
effect: F=.141, (1,91), p~.708); see Appendix A, Table 30 
for mean scores]. 
Third, subjects experiencing helplessness should have 
had statistically significantly higher scores on the 
"Reactance" index, Part A than subjects not experiencing 
helplessness. At the second posttest, however, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the high- and 
low-cost conditions with respect to these scores [(Cost main 
effect: F=l.673, (1,91), p~.199); see Appendix A, Table 31 
for mean scores]. 
Fourth, subjects experiencing helplessness should have 
had statistically significantly lower scores on the 
"Reactance" index, Part B than subjects not experiencing 
helplessness. At the second posttest, however, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the high- and 
low-cost conditions with respect to these scores [(Cost main 
effect: F=.104, (1,91), p5.747); see Appendix A, Table 32 
for mean scores). 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Negativity Bias 
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Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) claim to have ruled out 
the effect of a "negativity bias" - the finding that 
negative information exerts a greater judgmental impact than 
objectively equivalent positive information (e.g., Anderson, 
1965) - on their results. To test a potential effect of a 
negativity bias on the present results, at-test was 
performed to determine if women in the loss-framed 
conditions recalled loss-framed arguments statistically 
significantly more often than women in the gain-framed 
conditions recalled gain-framed arguments. There was an 
opposite statistically significant difference at the first 
posttest [(t=-4.828, (103), p5.005,); see Appendix A, Table 
38 for mean scores at both posttests) and at the second 
posttest (t=-2.938, (92), p5.005), such that women in gain-
framed conditions reported arguments in gain-framed language 
more frequently than women in loss-framed conditions 
reported loss-framed arguments, a result opposite of what 
the negativity bias would predict. Noted, however, should 
be the idea that recall does not necessarily have an impact 
on·attitudes. 
Fearful Content 
58 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) also claim to have ruled 
out the notion that their negative message was confounded by 
its fearful content, as high-fear appeals have generally 
been found to be more persuasive than low-fear appeals 
(e.g., Higbee, 1969). To test this potential confounding in 
the present study, subjects' cognitive responses were coded 
for reflections of fear. At the first posttest, there was 
no statistically significant difference between the gain-
and loss-framed conditions with respect to the number of 
times subjects mentioned being scared by their respective 
messages [(main effect, Frame: F=.541, (1,99), p5.464); see 
Appendix A, Table 39 for mean scores at both posttests], 
seeming to rule out the confounding of negative content and 
fear. There was, however, a marginally significant 
difference between the low- and high-cost conditions, those 
women in the low-cost conditions reporting greater fear than 
those women in the high-cost conditions (F=3.392, (1,99), 
p5.068). At the second posttest also, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the gain- and 
loss-framed conditions with respect to the number of times 
subjects mentioned being scared by their respective messages 
(main effect, Frame: F=2.061, (1,91), p5.l60). The main 
effect of the Cost manipulation, found at the first 
posttest, was not replicated. To be stressed with respect 
to these analyses should be the very small number of times 
subjects mentioned being scared. 
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Protection Motivation Theory Variables 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) attempted to rule .out 
the possibility that between the gain- and loss-framed 
conditions, women's attitudes and behaviors may have been 
affected via the influence of one or more variables given 
importance as predictors of health behavior within 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Rogers & 
Mewborn, 1976). Those variables are perceived severity (of 
breast cancer), perceived susceptibility (to breast cancer), 
perceived efficacy (of BSE), and perceived self-efficacy (in 
performing BSE). As the last was found to differentiate 
between women in the gain- and loss-framed conditions in 
Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) study, it was found to 
differentiate between women in the low- and high-cost 
conditions at the second posttest of this study [(F=7.115, 
(1,91), p5.009); see Table 29, Posttest 2 results] such that 
women in the high-cost conditions reported a greater sense 
of self-efficacy with respect to performing BSEs than did 
women in the low-cost conditions. All of the other 
protection motivation theory variables failed to 
differentiate among the conditions in this study 
[((perceived severity of breast cancer: posttest 1 two-way 
interaction: F=.009, (1,106), p5.923; posttest 2 two-way 
interaction: F=.337, (1,91), p5.563), see Table 40 for mean 
scores at both posttests); ((perceived susceptibility to 
breast cancer: posttest 1 two-way interaction: F=.533, 
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(1,107), p~.467; posttest 2 two-way interaction: F=.677, 
(1,91), p~.410), see Table 34 for mean scores at both 
posttests); ((perceived efficacy of BSE: posttest 1 two-way 
interaction: F=.230, (1,108), p=.633; posttest 2 two-way 
interaction: F=.620, (1,91), p~.430), see Table 35 for mean 
scores at both posttests); and ((perceived self-efficacy: 
posttest 1 two-way interaction: F=.001, (1,91), p~.980; 
posttest 2 two-way interaction: F=.428, (1,91), p~.515), see 
Table 29 for mean scores at both posttests)]. 
BSE Performance 
Performance of BSEs was determined by subjects' 
answers to three questions: 1) How many times, since you 
read the pamphlet on breast self-exams, did you perform a 
breast self-exam?; 2) How careful were you each time you 
performed a breast self-exam?; and 3) How thorough were you 
each time you performed a breast self-exam?. The last two 
questions had response options that ranged from 11 1, 11 or "not 
at all (careful) (thorough)" to 11 5," or "extremely (careful) 
(thorough)." A "total" performance score was calculated by 
weighting the number of times a subject performed a breast 
self-exam by 11 2 11 and adding that number to the numbers 
assigned to the "careful" and "thorough" questions. There 
was a marginally statistically significant two-way 
interaction (F=3.028, (1,91), p~.084; see Table 5 for mean 
scores) and a marginally statistically significant main 
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effect difference for the Cost condition (F=3.126, (1,91), 
p5.080) such that women in the high-cost conditions had 
higher scores on the BSE Performance index than did women in 
the low-cost conditions, and women in the high-cost, loss-
framed condition had the highest scores on the index. The 
expectation that women in the loss-framed, low-cost 
condition would have the highest BSE Performance index 
scores was not met; in fact, women in this condition had the 
lowest scores. 
Table 5. Mean scores of computed BSE Performance Index as a 
function of condition. 
LOW- HIGH-
COST COST 
LOSS- 4.81 8.77 6.70 
FRAME N=24 N=22 N=46 
GAIN- 6.72 6.81 6.76 
FRAME N=25 N=24 N=49 
5.78 7.75 
N=49 N=46 
Reported below is the average number of times women 
performed breast self-exams. There were no statistically 
significant differences across conditions with respect to 
this number (two-way interaction: F=2.321, (1,91), p~.131); 
see Table 6 for mean scores). Again, the expectation that 
women in the loss-framed, low-cost condition would perform 
BSEs most often was not met; in fact, women in this 
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condition performed BSEs the least often. 
Table 6. Mean scores of BSE performance as a function of 
condition. 
LOW- HIGH-
COST COST 
LOSS- .88 1.77 1.31 
FRAME N=24 N=22 N=46 
GAIN- 1.40 1.42 1.41 
FRAME N=25 N=24 N=49 
1.15 1.59 
N=49 N=46 
In an attempt to understand with a broad perspective 
what variables were most highly related to and contributing 
most to BSE performance, two analyses were performed. 
First, correlations were done among BSE performance index 
scores and variables measured at the first and second 
posttests. Second, using BSE performance index scores as a 
dependent variable and Posttest 1 variables most highly 
related to those scores as independent variables, a 
regression analysis was performed. 
The correlation matrix (see Table 7 below) comprises 
only those variables that were significantly related (p5.05) 
to the BSE performance index scores. Those variables were 
as follows: BSE attitudes (Posttests 1 and 2); BSE 
intentions (Posttests 1 and 2); self-efficacy (Posttests 1 
and 2): perceived severity of breast cancer (Posttests 1 and 
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2)i and perceived efficacy of BSE (Posttests 1 and 2). 
other variables included in the correlation analysis and not 
significantly related to BSE performance index scores (at 
either posttest) were as follows: breast cancer 
susceptibility, Reactance index A, Reactance index B, 
Illusion of Control index, MHLC Internal subscale, MHLC 
Powerful Others subscale, and MHLC Chance subscale. 
Table 7. Correlations between BSE Performance Index scores 
and Posttest 1 and Posttest 2 variables. 
ATTl ATT2 INTl INT2 SEl SE2 SVl SV2 EFFl EFF2 
PS .264 .381 .350 .451 .246 .256 .188 .263 .184 .301 
(91) {93) (95) (93) (93) (93) (93) (93) (95) {93) 
.:5.: .006 .000 .ooo .000 .009 .007 .035 .005 .037 .002 
Note: .$. indicates p,$.. 
Underlined in Table 7 are those variables used in the 
regression analysis to predict BSE performance index scores. 
In view of the experimenter's uncertainty as to what 
variables would best predict BSE performance index scores 
and also of the exploratory nature of these analyses, a 
stepwise regression analysis was performed. The results 
from this analysis showed that both BSE intentions and 
perceived efficacy of BSE were significant predictors of BSE 
performance index scores {See Table 8 below). 
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1flble 8. Results of a stepwise regression analysis using BSE 
Performance Index scores as the dependent variable. 
variables in the Equation 
variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
asE intentions 1.47 .455 .323 3.24 .0017 
BSE efficacy .595 .286 .207 2.08 .0408 
variables not in the Equation 
variable Beta In Partial Min 
BSE attitudes .094 .088 .734 
self efficacy .113 .117 .903 
BC severity .041 .041 .864 
Toler T Sig T 
.805 .4229 
1.082 .2823 
.378 .706 
Curiously, perceived efficacy of BSE scores were not 
different across conditions, i.e., the high-cost 
conditions, whose subjects had higher scores on the BSE 
performance index did not also have higher scores on the 
perceived efficacy of BSE items. Also noteworthy was the 
inability of BSE attitude scores to predict BSE performance 
index scores; BSE intention scores were a more powerful 
predictor. Finally, the inability of perceived self-
efficacy scores to predict BSE performance index scores was 
somewhat surprising given their difference across 
conditions, i.e., subjects in high-cost conditions had 
higher BSE performance index scores and higher-self-efficacy 
scores than did subjects in low-cost conditions but self-
efficacy scores could not predict the former. To be noted, 
however, is the notion that a regression analysis using 
independent variables from Posttest 2 might result in 
different predictors than did the present one. 
· Pamphlet Impact 
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Mainly as a descriptive effort, women were asked at 
the second posttest some questions related to how much they 
felt participating in the study affected their attitudes 
towards breast self-exams and towards breast cancer. Eleven 
such questions, whose response options ranged from "1," or 
"not at all" to "5," or "very, very much," made up this 
"Pamphlet Impact" index. There were no statistically 
significant differences (two-way interaction: F=.000, (1,90) 
p~.982; see Table 41 for mean scores) among the four 
conditions with respect to their totals on this index. The 
grand mean was 24.63, yielding an average of 2.24/5 for each 
item, an average reflecting a response between "not much" 
and "somewhat". 
Dividing the Pamphlet Impact questions into those 
related to breast self-exams and those related to breast 
cancer, there were no statistically significant differences 
among the four groups ((BSE questions, two-way interaction: 
F=.082, (1,90), p~.775; BC questions, two-way interaction: 
F=.131, (1,90), p~.718); see Tables 42 and 43 for mean 
scores). 
DISCUSSION 
Manipulation Checks 
A logical topic with which to begin a discussion of 
study results seems to be whether or not the manipulations 
were successful. In the present study, they were in one 
respect. At the first pilot test and at the first and 
second posttests, subjects in gain-framed conditions 
recalled arguments in gain language significantly more often 
than did subjects in loss-framed conditions, subjects in 
loss-framed conditions reported arguments in loss language 
significantly more often than did subjects in gain-framed 
conditions, and subjects in low-cost conditions reported 
arguments in terms of low cost significantly more often than 
did subjects in high-cost conditions. Virtually no one, at 
any of the tests, however, reported arguments in terms of 
high-cost. Possibly, this lack of reporting was due to the 
non-straightforwardness of high-cost messages, as they 
conveyed high-cost implicitly rather than explicitly. Such 
implicity was important with respect to the ethical issue of 
stating in a blunt manner that breast self-exams are 
extremely difficult and time-consuming when in fact the 
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opposite is true. 
Although the gain-frame, loss-frame, and low-cost 
manipulations did appear successful overall, there were some 
concerns of confounding of manipulations at the pilot test, 
such that subjects in low-cost conditions reported arguments 
in gain language more often than did subjects in high-cost 
conditions, subjects in high-cost conditions reported 
arguments in loss language more often than did subjects in 
low-cost conditions, and subjects in the loss-framed, low-
cost condition reported arguments in terms of low cost more 
often than did subjects in the other conditions. These 
effects, however, were not found again at the first or 
second posttests, leading the experimenter to believe that 
the effects were not reliable and were possibly due to the 
unrefined pamphlet that was improved on with respect to 
wording that might possibly confound conditions. 
The low recall of cost arguments in general (low-cost 
arguments were seldom recalled as were high-cost ones) might 
be due to subjects' interpretation of the word "argument." 
A statement stressing the importance of doing BSEs (a 
"frame" argument) probably resembles an argument more than 
does a statement stressing the minimal amount of time 
required to perform BSEs. 
Also noteworthy with respect to argument recall was 
that subjects in gain-framed conditions reported arguments 
in gain language more often than subjects in loss-framed 
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conditions reported arguments in loss language. This effect 
might be due to the greater ease in remembering gain-framed 
arguments, as the loss-framed arguments were structurally 
more difficult to remember and recall. 
To be noted is that although the manipulation checks 
were successful overall, the number of arguments recalled 
was very low. Thus, for some reason (e.g., motivation), 
subjects did not perform well on the recall task. Possibly, 
however, they may have correctly perceived the arguments, 
and there might be other types of manipulation checks to 
assess the accuracy of subjects' argument perception. For 
example, after the experiment, the researcher could present 
subjects with two pages of frame arguments and two pages of 
cost arguments and then ask subjects to identify which 
arguments they had in their pamphlets. Another type 
of manipulation check might be one of perception/evaluation 
of the messages. For example, a check on the cost arguments 
might ask how much time and effort is required to do BSE and 
a check on the frame arguments might ask what the gains or 
losses of doing or not doing BSE are. These latter kinds of 
checks on perception might be related to attitudes even 
though the recall check was not. 
Accuracy of Measures 
Some of the measures tested for reliability were 
highly internally reliable, others were acceptably reliable, 
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and others were borderline reliable. Having addressed the 
issue of reliability, the question that follows is whether 
or not the measures were valid. To be discussed further on 
in the Discussion section is the notion that some of the 
measures may not have been valid. Of special concern were 
the Reactance indices, the Helplessness indices, and the 
Illusion of Control indices. All of those were constructed 
by the experimenter and were tested for convergent validity. 
The analyses indicated a lack of validity. Valid measures 
of these constructs need be developed in future research in 
order for a better test of these study and other related 
study hypotheses. Clearly, the interpretation of the 
current study results needs consider the question of 
validity with respect to those indices, as their lack of 
validity might account, in part, for their failure as 
predicted mediators between message reception and later 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviors. 
Cognitive Responses 
In both pilot tests and both posttests, there was no 
difference across conditions with respect to favorability or 
source of cognitive responses. In fact, the majority of 
women at all tests reported "neutral, issue" responses. 
Such reporting may not warrant great surprise as BSE is 
probably viewed as neither favorable nor unfavorable and was 
the topic of the pamphlet. 
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Combining the data from the two pilot tests, subjects 
with more favorable cognitive responses were somewhat more 
likely to have more positive attitudes than were subjects 
with unfavorable or neutral cognitive responses. This 
effect, however, was not found again at either posttest. 
Given the greater number of subjects at the posttests and 
also the marginality of the pilot test results' 
significance, the posttest results are probably more 
trustworthy, lending support to the conclusion that 
favorability of cognitive responses cannot reliably predict 
BSE attitudes. Of course, this finding is contrary to other 
research (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) which has found 
that the favorability of cognitive responses can reliably 
predict attitudes towards a given attitude object. 
Possibly, the lack of variation in the cognitive responses 
(i.e., most responses were "neutral") reported by subjects 
in this study accounts for their inability to predict BSE 
attitudes. 
In both pilot tests and both posttests, there was no 
difference across conditions with respect to the effects of 
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE 
intentions. These results, coupled with the cognitive 
responses' absence of effect on BSE attitudes lends support 
to the conclusion that favorability and source of cognitive 
responses did not predict BSE intentions. Again, however, 
should be noted the lack of variation in cognitive responses 
and hence the possibility that this lack could account for 
their inability to predict BSE intentions. 
Attitudes. Intentions. Self-efficacy. and Behavior 
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Prior to presenting the results with respect to the 
main dependent variables, a brief summary of the hypotheses 
regarding them will be outlined. At the first posttest, all 
women were expected to have positive BSE attitudes, great 
intentions of performing BSEs, and high self-efficacy in 
performing BSEs. At the second posttest, women in the loss-
framed, low-cost condition were expected to have the most 
positive attitudes towards, the greatest intentions of 
performing, the highest self-efficacy in performing, and to 
have actually performed BSEs most often, followed by those 
women in the gain-framed, low-cost condition, followed by 
those women in the gain-framed, high-cost condition, 
followed by those women in the loss-framed, high-cost 
condition. 
Having outlined the main study hypotheses, the main 
dependent variables will be discussed separately and jointly 
with respect to study findings. At the first posttest, 
there was no difference across conditions with respect to 
BSE attitudes, intentions, or self-efficacy. At the second 
posttest, women in the high-cost conditions had more 
favorable attitudes towards performing breast self-exams 
than did women in the low-cost conditions, women in the 
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gain-framed and high-cost conditions had greater intentions 
of performing breast self-exams than did women in the loss-
framed and low-cost conditions, and women in the high-cost 
conditions reported a greater sense of self-efficacy in 
performing breast self-exams than did women in the low-cost 
conditions, and finally, women in the high-cost conditions, 
and especially those in the loss-framed, high-cost condition 
had higher scores on the BSE Performance index than did 
women in the other conditions. 
Due to the observation that at the first posttest 
there were very few differences across conditions but at the 
second posttest there were some differences and also to the 
observation that attitudes and intentions became more 
favorable and greater, respectively, at the second posttest 
for women in all but the low-cost, loss-framed condition 
(and especially more favorable and greater for women in 
high-cost conditions), a repeated measures MANOVA was 
performed to test whether or not those differences over time 
were significant. Results from this analysis showed that 
women in high-cost conditions changed their attitudes in a 
positive manner more than did women in low-cost conditions 
[(Cost by BSE attitudes effect: F=4.72, (1,86), p~.033); see 
Table 2 for marginal means]; however, this effect must be 
interpreted with respect to an interaction such that women 
in high-cost conditions displayed such change only if they 
were also in the loss-framed condition (Frame by Cost by BSE 
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attitudes effect: F=4.72, (1,86), p5.020). This finding is 
strong evidence against the hypothesis that women in the 
loss-framed, low-cost condition would show the greatest 
positive change in BSE attitudes and that women in the loss-
framed, high-cost condition would show the least. Also from 
this analysis, results showed that women in gain-framed 
conditions tended to change their intentions of performing 
BSE in a greater manner more than did women in loss-framed 
conditions [(Frame by BSE attitudes effect: F=2.68, (1,90), 
p5.105); see Table 3 for marginal means]. This finding, 
too, is contrary to the hypothesis that women in the low-
cost, loss-framed condition would show the greatest positive 
change in their intentions of performing BSEs. 
Related to the above analyses are the cross-lagged 
correlations of attitudes and intentions at Posttest 1 and 
Posttest 2. Although attitudes and intentions were 
significantly related to each other at Posttest 1 and 
Posttest 2, the cross-lagged correlations were somewhat low, 
indicating that scores on one measure might not reliably 
predict scores on the other measure. Further related to the 
repeated measures analysis results was the finding that 
although Posttest 1 BSE attitude scores and BSE intention 
scores were significantly related to BSE performance index 
scores, only BSE intention scores were reliable predictors 
of BSE performance index scores. Possibly, BSE attitudes 
and BSE intentions operate via different processes both in 
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the way they are affected by differently-framed messages and 
in the way they affect behavior with respect to those 
messages. 
In sum, although no differences were found across 
conditions on the major dependent variables at the first 
posttest, no differences were expected at this time due to 
the belief that all women, regardless of condition, would be 
highly motivated immediately after receiving their 
pamphlets. As expected, differences were found at the 
second posttest, but those differences were contrary to 
study expectations. The major commonality among the 
findings was that women in the high-cost conditions had the 
most favorable attitudes towards breast self-exams, the 
greatest intentions of performing breast self-exams, the 
highest self-efficacy with respect to breast self-exams, and 
the highest scores on the BSE Performance index. Possibly, 
these findings could find partial explanation in Cognitive 
Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) or other cognitive 
consistency theories that view people as rational thinkers. 
In line with such theories, women exposed to the message 
that performing BSEs will require a great deal of time and 
effort might come to believe that such performance must be 
very important and worthwhile. Or, put another way, given 
the assumption that most people believe that important 
matters (e.g., breast cancer) require great effort (i. e., 
high-cost behavior), the high-cost message might sound more 
realistic and accurate to women than the low-cost message. 
rronic is the fact that with respect to the matter at hand 
(BSEs), little time and effort really is all that is 
required. 
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Outside of theorizing, a more immediate, empirical 
question might be, "What study variables best predict BSE 
performance?". As noted in the Results section, five 
Posttest 1 variables that had significant correlations with 
BSE performance index scores were entered into a regression 
analysis in order to ascertain which of those five 
(attitudes towards BSE, intentions of performing BSE, 
perceived self-efficacy in performing BSE, perceived 
severity of breast cancer, and perceived efficacy of BSE) 
might best predict BSE performance. Of those variables, 
only BSE intentions and perceived efficacy of BSE were 
significant predictors of BSE performance. The weakness of 
attitudes as a predictor was somewhat surprising, especially 
given the high correlation between attitudes and intentions 
at the second posttest (See Table 4). Also surprising was 
the weakness of perceived self-efficacy as a predictor, 
especially coupled with the strength of perceived efficacy 
of BSE as a predictor, i.e., subjects in high-cost 
conditions had higher BSE performance index scores and 
higher perceived self-efficacy scores than subjects in other 
conditions but they did not have higher BSE efficacy scores. 
Psychological Processes 
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Reactance. Illusion of Control. and Helplessness 
The conditions expected to undergo the different 
psychological processes at the two posttests did not do so. 
The only difference with respect to those processes was at 
the second posttest, at which time women in the low-cost 
conditions had higher scores on the Illusion of Control 
index than women in the high-cost conditions, this finding 
seeming to be a logical one. 
Why women did not undergo the expected processes might 
be explained in more than one way. First, the indices used 
to measure those processes might not have been valid. 
Second, women simply might not have undergone the expected 
processes. Third, both of those explanations could be true. 
If there exists the possibility that women in the high-cost 
conditions underwent cognitive dissonance or some similar 
process, such a process might have been the one around which 
to base this study or future studies. 
Alternative Explanations 
Negativity Bias 
As discussed earlier, women in gain-framed conditions 
reported arguments in gain language significantly more often 
than women in loss-framed conditions reported arguments in 
loss language, seeming to rule out the idea that a 
negativity bias might be confounding study results. 
Although recall may not be capable of reflecting the 
negativity bias, in the context of this study especially, 
the negativity bias is very unlikely operating given the 
lack of results to indicate that women in the loss-framed 
conditions were more positively affected by their messages 
in terms of breast self-exam attitudes, intentions, self-
efficacy, and behavior. 
Fearful Content 
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As noted above, the likelihood that fearful content 
would be operating is not great given the lack of results to 
indicate that women in the loss-framed conditions were more 
positively affected by their messages. In fact, the only 
difference with respect to fear was at the first posttest, 
at which time women in the low-cost conditions reported 
greater fear than did women in the high-cost conditions. 
Possibly, this finding could be interpreted in terms of 
consistency theory, such that women told that performing 
BSEs is neither difficult nor time-consuming might then 
think that it must be scary. That is to say, women might 
believe that given the seriousness of breast cancer, any 
prevention measure must also have some degree of 
seriousness, if not in the act itself (a high-cost 
behavior), then in its emotionality (e.g., fear). Or 
possibly, women exposed to the low-cost message might think 
that they have been given inaccurate or naive information 
and resultingly feel scared that they will not be able to 
perform BSE properly, i.e., their fear might stem from 
their lack of self-efficacy. 
Protection Motivation Theory Variables 
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The only protection motivation theory variable that 
differentiated among women in this study was self-efficacy. 
As mentioned earlier, women in the high-cost conditions 
reported a greater sense of self-efficacy with respect to 
performing BSEs than did women in the low-cost conditions. 
This finding was discussed above in terms of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
An Overview 
Quite possibly, this study confronted problems at 
early phases. The low message argument recall might have 
indicated a weakness in the success of the manipulation. 
Also, the lack of validity among the measures intended to 
represent different psychological processes might have 
contributed to subjects' seemingly random scores on those 
measures. Future research certainly need ascertain in a 
more definite manner that the manipulations are successful 
and that all study measures are valid. Despite those study 
problems, there were some differences in some of the 
subjects• responses across the four conditions. In general, 
the high-cost message seemed to be more effective than the 
low-cost message and the loss-framed, low-cost message 
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seemed to be the least effective, findings contrary to 
expectations and to Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) results. 
The present study might suggest limitations on the 
generalizations those authors made with respect to the 
greater effectiveness of loss than gain-framed messages. 
Already proposed was the notion that Cognitive Dissonance 
theory (Festinger, 1957) and other theories that view people 
as rational thinkers might help in interpreting the study's 
unexpected results. More explicitly stated, people exposed 
to high-cost messages might believe that an act which 
requires a good deal of time and effort must be an important 
and worthwhile one moreso than people exposed to messages 
that stress an act's minimal time and effort. Of course, 
there exist other types of theories that could contend the 
ability to interpret the study results. Future studies, 
then, might posit one or more theories in the context of 
this or similar studies and attempt to test what theory best 
explains the study results. Such testing might lead to 
other studies that attempt to understand what kinds of 
messages are most effective in promoting positive attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors with respect to a given issue. 
APPENDIX A 
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Table 9 . Favorability of cognitive responses as a function 
of condition, using data from Pilot tests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
PILOT TEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
FAV: 0 FAV: 
UNFAV: 0 UNFAV: 
NTRL: 10 NTRL: 
FAV: 1 FAV: 
UNFAV: 1 UNFAV: 
NTRL: 10 NTRL: 
7 
0 
7 
5 
0 
7 
PILOT TEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
FAV: 1 FAV: 1 
UNFAV: 0 UNFAV: 0 
NRTL: 5 NTRL: 5 
FAV: 1 FAV: 0 
UNFAV: 0 UNFAV: 0 
NTRL: 5 NTRL: 6 
Table 10. Source of cognitive responses as a function of 
condition, using data from Pilot tests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
PILOT TEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
MSSGE: 1 MSSGE: 1 
ISSUE: 12 ISSUE: 10 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 1 ISSUE: 4 
MSSGE: 1 MSSGE: 2 
ISSUE: 12 ISSUE: 7 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 1 ISSUE: 3 
PILOT TEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
MSSGE: 0 MSSGE: 3 
ISSUE: 4 ISSUE: 1 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 2 ISSUE: 2 
MSSGE: 0 MSSGE: 0 
ISSUE: 4 ISSUE: 3 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 2 ISSUE: 2 
I,able 11. 
MESSAGE 
SOURCE 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE & 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
Mean score results of an ANOVA examining the 
effects of cognitive response favorability and 
source on BSE attitudes for both Pilot Tests 
combined, using Attitude index items 1-11 only. 
COGNITIVE RESPONSE FAVORABILITY 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE NEUTRAL 
70.25 00.00 66.00 
N=4 N=0 N=6 
69.88 56.00 67.79 
N=8 N=l N=39 
69.50 00.00 63.60 
N=8 N=0 N=l0 
Table 12 . Mean-score results of an ANOVA examining the 
effects of cognitive response favorability and 
source on BSE intentions for both Pilot Tests 
combined. 
MESSAGE 
SOURCE 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE & 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
COGNITIVE RESPONSE FAVORABILITY 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE NEUTRAL 
6.25 o.oo 5.83 
N=4 N=0 N=6 
6.00 6.00 5.87 
N=8 N=l N=39 
6.25 o.oo 5.70 
N=8 N=0 N=l0 
82 
83 
xable 13 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in gain language as 
a function of condition, using data from Pilot 
Test 1. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
1.60 
N=15 
3.00 
N=12 
HIGH-COST 
.87 
N=15 
2.42 
n=12 
Table 14 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in loss language as 
a function of condition, using data from Pilot 
Test 1. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
.73 
N=15 
o.oo 
N=12 
HIGH-COST 
1.67 
N=15 
.17 
N=12 
Table 15. Recall of pamphlet arguments in terms of low-cost 
as a function of condition, using data from Pilot 
Test 1. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
.40 
N=15 
.oo 
N=12 
HIGH-COST 
.07 
N=15 
.08 
N=12 
Table 16. BSE attitudes as a function of condition, using 
data from Pilot Test 1. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
69.47 
N=15 
69.08 
N=12 
HIGH-COST 
68.07 
N=15 
71.00 
N=12 
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Table 17 . BSE intentions as a function of condition, using 
data from Pilot Test 1. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
6.20 
N=15 
6.50 
N=12 
HIGH-COST 
5.60 
N=l5 
5.83 
N=12 
Table 18 . BSE attitudes as a function of condition, using 
data From Pilot Test 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
83.00 
N=8 
71.86 
N=7 
HIGH-COST 
78.29 
N=7 
72.50 
N=8 
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I_slble 19 . BSE intentions as a function of condition, using 
data from Pilot Test 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
5.50 
N=8 
5.43 
N=7 
HIGH-COST 
6.00 
N=7 
5.25 
N=8 
Table 20 . BSE attitudes as a function of condition, using 
data from Pilot Tests 1 and 2 combined and 
Attitude index Items 1-11 only. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
68.61 
N=23 
65.11 
N=l9 
HIGH-COST 
66.73 
N=22 
66.10 
N=20 
Table 21. BSE intentions as a function of condition, using 
data From Pilot Tests 1 and 2 combined. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
5.96 
N=23 
6.11 
N=19 
HIGH-COST 
5.73 
N=22 
5.60 
N=20 
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,r_able 22 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in gain language as 
a function of condition, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
.68 .32 .25 .41 
N=28 N=28 N=24 N=22 
1.81 2.00 .96 1.25 
N=27 N=25 N=24 N=24 
Table 23 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in loss language as 
a function of condition, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
.86 .76 .75 .73 
N=28 N=25 N=24 N=22 
.04 .00 .oo .oo 
N=27 N=25 N=24 N=24 
Table 24 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in terms of low cost 
as a function of condition, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
.25 .08 .oo .oo 
N=28 N=25 N=24 N=22 
.26 .04 .04 .oo 
N=27 N=25 N=25 N=24 
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T.able 25. Favorability of cognitive responses as a function 
of condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
FAV: 2 FAV: 3 
UNFAV: 3 UNFAV: 1 
NTRL: 20 NTRL: 22 
FAV: 3 FAV: 1 
UNFAV: 1 UNFAV: 2 
NTRL: 22 NTRL: 20 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
FAV: 3 FAV: 0 
UNFAV: 0 UNFAV: 1 
NTRL: 20 NTRL: 21 
FAV: 1 FAV: 2 
UNFAV: 3 UNFAV: 0 
NTRL: 17 NTRL: 20 
Table 26. Source of cognitive responses as a function of 
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
MSSGE: 4 MSSGE: 2 
ISSUE: 19 ISSUE: 16 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 2 ISSUE: 8 
MSSGE: 4 MSSGE: 1 
ISSUE: 21 ISSUE: 19 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 3 ISSUE: 3 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
MSSGE: 3 MSSGE: 6 
ISSUE: 13 ISSUE: 16 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 7 ISSUE: 1 
MSSGE: 9 MSSGE: 4 
ISSUE: 11 ISSUE: 17 
MSSGE & MSSGE & 
ISSUE: 1 ISSUE: 1 
I,_able 27 . 
MESSAGE 
SOURCE 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE 
& ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE 
SOURCE 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE 
& ISSUE 
SOURCE 
Mean score results of an ANOVA examining the 
effects of cognitive response favorability and 
source on BSE attitudes, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
POSTTEST 1 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE 
68.67 76.67 
N=3 N=3 
80.40 76.00 
N=5 N=4 
81. 00 o.oo 
N=l N=0 
POSTTEST 2 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE 
66.67 76.00 
N=3 N=3 
82.00 0.00 
N=2 N=0 
90.00 59.00 
N=l N=l 
NEUTRAL 
88.00 
N=3 
75.02 
N=62 
73.71 
N=14 
NEUTRAL 
78.38 
N=16 
78.73 
N=55 
76.57 
N=7 
88 
Table 28. Mean score results of an ANOVA examining the 
effects of cognitive response favorability and 
source on BSE intentions, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
MESSAGE 
SOURCE 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE 
& ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE 
SOURCE 
ISSUE 
SOURCE 
MESSAGE 
& ISSUE 
SOURCE 
POSTTEST 1 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE 
7.00 5.00 
N=3 N=3 
5.60 5.75 
N=5 N=4 
6.00 o.oo 
N=l N=0 
POSTTEST 2 
FAVORABLE UNFAVORABLE 
5.67 5.67 
N=3 N=3 
6.00 o.oo 
N=2 N=0 
7.00 7.00 
N=l N=l 
NEUTRAL 
6.33 
N=3 
5.70 
N=66 
5.80 
N=15 
NEUTRAL 
6.13 
N=16 
5.80 
N=55 
5.43 
N=7 
Table 29 . Mean scores of self-efficacy as a function of 
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
10.29 10.93 
N=28 N=27 
10.75 11.37 
N=28 N=27 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
10.79 11.91 
N=24 N=22 
11.32 12.00 
N=25 N=24 
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Table 30 . Mean scores of the MHLC Internal subscale as a 
function of condition, using data from Posttests 
1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
27.64 26.89 
N=28 N=28 
26.56 26.68 
N=27 N=28 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
27.50 27.00 
N=24 N=22 
25.60 26.75 
N=25 N=24 
Table 31. Mean scores of the "Reactance" index, Part A, as 
function of condition, using data from Posttests 
1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
39.35 41.93 
N=26 N=28 
38.93 38.58 
N=27 N=26 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
44.58 46.45 
N=24 N=22 
40.08 44.46 
N=25 N=24 
Table 32. Mean scores of the "Reactance" index, Part B, as a 
function of condition, using data from Posttests 1 
and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
59.33 60.32 
N=27 N=28 
57.58 61.15 
N=27 N=27 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
60.71 58.27 
N=24 N=22 
59.32 60.71 
N=25 N=24 
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Table 33. Intercorrelations among MHLC Internal subscale z-
scores, "Reactance" index, Part AZ-scores, and 
"Reactance" index, Part B Z-scores, using data 
from Posttests 1 and 2 (Pl and P2). 
MHLCI REACTA REACTB 
MHLC, Pl: 1.0000 
INTERNAL (111) 
SUBSCALE P=. 
(MHLCI) P2: 1. 0000 
(95) 
P= . 
REACTANCE Pl: • 0157 Pl: 1.0000 
INDEX, PART A (106) (107) 
(REACTA) P=.437 P=. 
P2: -.2615 P2: 1.0000 
(95) (95) 
P=.005 P=. 
REACTANCE Pl: .2622 Pl: -.1244 Pl: 1.0000 
INDEX, PART B (108) (106) (109) 
(REACTB) P=.003 P=.102 P=. 
P2: .2226 P2: .0877 P2: 1.0000 
(95) (95) (95) 
P=.015) P=.199 P=. 
Table 34. Mean scores of item reflecting breast cancer 
susceptibility as a function of condition, using 
data from Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
3.96 3.46 
N=28 N=28 
4.04 3.89 
N=28 N=27 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
3.54 3.68 
N=24 N=22 
3.68 4.29 
N=25 N=24 
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Table 35 . Mean scores of the items reflecting BSE efficacy 
as a function of condition, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
11.18 11.29 
N=28 N=28 
10.71 11.21 
N=28 N=28 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
11.00 12.00 
N=24 N=22 
11.12 11.46 
N=25 N=24 
Table 36 . Mean scores of the "Illusion of Control" index as 
a function of condition, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
24.52 25.31 
N=25 N=26 
26.39 25.77 
N=23 N=26 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
27.59 23.73 
N=22 N=22 
27.36 24.79 
N=25 N=24 
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Table 37. Intercorrelations among Breast Cancer 
Susceptibility z-score, BSE efficacy z-score, and 
"Illusion of Control" index Z-score, using data 
from Posttests 1 and 2 (Pl and P2). 
BCSS BSEEFF ILLCNTL 
BREAST Pl: 1.0000 
CANCER (111) 
SUSCEPTIBILITY P=. 
(BCSS) P2: 1.0000 
(95) 
P=. 
BREAST Pl: .1223 Pl: 1.0000 
SELF-EXAM (111) (112) 
EFFICACY P=.100 P=. 
(BSEEFF) P2: -.2158 P2: 1.0000 
(95) (95) 
P=.018 P=. 
ILLUSION Pl: .1922 Pl: -.0332 Pl: 1.0000 
OF CONTROL (100) (100) (100) 
(ILLCNTL) P=.028 P=.371 P=. 
P2: .0690 P2: -.2138 P2: 1.0000 
(93) (93) (93) 
P=.256 P=.020 P=. 
Table 38. Mean numbers of gain- and loss-framed arguments 
recalled as a function of respective gain- and 
loss-framed conditions, using data from Posttests 
1 and 2. 
GAIN-FRAMED: LOSS-FRAMED: 
# GAIN ARGUMENTS# LOSS ARGUMENTS 
POSTTEST 1 1.904 .811 
N=52 N=53 
POSTTEST 2 1.104 .739 
N=48 N=46 
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Table 39 • Mean scores of cognitive responses reflecting 
fear as· a function of condition, using data from 
Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
.22 .12 
N=27 N=26 
.19 .04 
N=26 N=24 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
.08 .09 
N=24 N=22 
.04 .oo 
N=25 N=24 
Table 40 . Mean scores of perceived severity of breast 
cancer as a function of condition, using data 
from Posttests 1 and 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
POSTTEST 1 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
6.18 6.18 
N=28 N=28 
6.08 6.04 
N=26 N=28 
POSTTEST 2 
LOW-COST HIGH-COST 
6.08 6.14 
N=24 N=22 
6.04 6.38 
N=25 N=24 
Table 41 . Mean total scores of Pamphlet Impact 
Questionnaire as a function of condition, using 
data from Posttest 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
26.33 
N=24 
24.46 
N=24 
HIGH-COST 
24.77 
N=22 
22.96 
N=24 
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Table 42. Mean scores of Pamphlet Impact questions related 
to breast self-exams, using data from Posttest 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
11.50 
N=24 
10.79 
N=24 
HIGH-COST 
11.09 
N=22 
10.04 
N=24 
Table 43. Mean scores of Pamphlet Impact questions related 
to breast cancer, using data from Posttest 2. 
LOSS-
FRAME 
GAIN-
FRAME 
LOW-COST 
12.33 
N=24 
11.38 
N=24 
HIGH-COST 
11.32 
N=22 
10.88 
N=24 
APPENDIX B 
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BSE Attitudes Pretest 
For each of the following statements, please place an "X" on 
the line that indicates the position with which you agree 
most. 
1. I feel that vigorous exercise is: 
enjoyable unenjoyable 
2. I believe that vigorous exercise is: 
harmful beneficial 
3. I feel that a good night's rest is: 
enjoyable 
4. I believe that a good night's rest is: 
unenjoyable 
beneficial harmful 
5. I feel that performing breast self-exams is: 
harmful beneficial 
6. I believe that performing breast self-exams is: 
unenjoyable enjoyable 
7. I feel that smoking cigarettes is: 
enjoyable unenjoyable 
8. I believe that smoking cigarettes is: 
beneficial harmful 
9. I feel that eating well-balanced meals is: 
unenj oyable _ enjoyable 
10. I believe that eating well-balanced meals is: 
harmful beneficial 
11. I feel that taking care of myself when I am sick is: 
beneficial harmful 
12. I believe taking care of myself when I am sick is: 
enjoyable unenjoyable 
Measure of Perceived susceptibility to Breast Cancer 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that 
you will get breast cancer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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no likelihood very great 
likelihood 
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Measure of Perceived Severity of Breast Cancer 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the extent to which 
you think that breast cancer is a frightening and dangerous 
disease. 
1 2 
not at all 
frightening 
and dangerous 
3 4 5 6 7 
extremely 
frightening 
and 
dangerous 
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Measure of Beliefs in BSE's Efficacy 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the effectiveness of 
breast self-exams in diagnosing breast cancer. 
1 
no 
effectiveness 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very high 
effectiveness 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that 
breast self-exams can affect one's health. 
1 
no 
likelihood 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very great 
likelihood 
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Measure of Perceived Self-Efficacy in Performing BSE 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how confident you are 
that performing a breast self-exam will enable you to detect 
a lump in your breasts. 
1 
not at all 
confident 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
extremely 
confident 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that 
you can learn to perform a breast self-exam effectively. 
1 
no 
likelihood 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very great 
likelihood 
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Measure of Cognitive Responses 
Often, one reflects on what one is reading. Please write 
down all the thoughts that occurred to you while reading 
your pamphlet. Be assured that no thoughts are more valid 
than other thoughts; all of your thoughts are valuable. 
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Measure of Pamphlet Argument and Procedure Recall 
Please write down the arguments that the pamphlet you read 
mentioned with respect to the importance of performing 
breast self-exams. Then, please write down the correct 
procedure your pamphlet outlined for performing breast self-
exams. 
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Wallston et al. (1978) MHLC Scale. Form A 
Please indicate your agreement (disagreement) with each of 
the following items, "1" being "strongly disagree," and "6" 
being "strongly agree." 
1. If I get sick, it is my own behavior which determines how 
soon I will get well again. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
2. No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick, I will 
get sick. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
3. Having regular contact with my physician is the best way 
for me to avoid illness. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
4. Most things that affect my health happen to me by 
accident. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
5. Whenever I don't feel well, I should consult a medically 
trained professional. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
6. I am in control of my own health. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
7. My family has a lot to do with my becoming sick or 
staying healthy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
8. When I get sick I am to blame. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
9. Luck plays a big part in determining how soon I will 
recover from an illness. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
10. Health 
1 
strongly 
disagree 
2 
11. My good 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 
professionals control my health. 
3 4 5 
health is largely a matter of good 
3 4 5 
6 
strongly 
agree 
6 
strongly 
agree 
fortune. 
6 
strongly 
agree 
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12. The main thing which affects my health is what I myself 
do. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
13. If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strong:J_y 
agree 
14. When I recover from an illness, it's usually because 
other people (for example, doctors, nurses, family, 
friends) have been taking care of me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
15. No matter what I do, I'm likely to get sick. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
16. If it's meant to be, I will stay healthy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
17. If I take the right actions, I can stay healthy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
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18. Regarding my health, I can only do what my doctor tells 
me to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
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Wallston et al. (1978) MHLC Scale. Form B 
Please indicate your agreement (disagreement) with each of 
the following items, "1" being "strongly disagree" and "6" 
being "strongly agree." 
1. If I become sick, I have the power to make myself well 
again. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
2. Often I feel that no matter what I do, if I am going to 
get sick, I will get sick. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
3. If I see an excellent doctor regularly, I am less likely 
to have health problems. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
4. It seems that my health is greatly influenced by 
accidental happenings. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
5. I can only maintain my health by consulting health 
professionals. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 
6. I am directly responsible for my own health. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 
6 
strongly 
agree 
6 
strongly 
agree 
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7. Other people play a big part in whether I stay healthy or 
become sick. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
8. Whatever goes wrong with my health is my own fault. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
9. When I am sick, I just have to let nature run its course. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 
10. Health professionals keep me healthy. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 
11. When I stay healthy, I'm just plain lucky. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 
6 
strongly 
agree 
6 
strongly 
agree 
6 
strongly 
agree 
12. My physical well-being depends on how well I take care 
of myself. 
1 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
13. When I feel ill, I know it is because I have not been 
taking care of myself properly. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
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14. The type of care I receive from other people is what is 
responsible for how well I recover from an illness. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
15. Even when I take care of myself, it's easy to get sick. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
16. When I become ill, it's a matter of fate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
17. I can pretty much stay healthy by taking good care of 
myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
18. Regarding my health, I can only do what my doctor tells 
me to do. 
1 2 
strongly 
disagree 
3 4 5 6 
strongly 
agree 
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Reactance Measure. A Description 
The theory of reactance (J. W. Brehm, 1966; s. s. 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wortman & Brehm, 1975) maintains that 
several responses can follow a loss of control. The first 
is hostility or aggressive feelings; this response was 
tested by observing the cognitive responses of the subjects. 
The second is direct efforts to restore lost freedoms; this 
response was tested by inspection of the MHLC scores. 
Scores for those people experiencing reactance should have 
been higher on the internal scale than scores for those 
people not experiencing reactance. The third is changes in 
perceptions of the outcomes, threatened or arbitrarily 
eliminated outcomes becoming more attractive and outcomes 
that remain available losing some of their attraction; this 
response was tested by the following indices. Subjects 
experiencing reactance should have had lower scores on the 
first index and higher scores on the second index than 
subjects not experiencing reactance. 
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Reactance Index. Part A 
Please indicate, by circling the number that most accurately 
describes your position, how much you value the following 
ideals, ideals often threatened by having breast cancer, 11 1 11 
being "not at all value," and "7" being "value very. very 
much." 
l=not at all 
2=very little 
3=little 
4=somewhat 
5=pretty much 
6=very much 
?=very, very much 
1. good health 
2. relaxation 
3. a worry-free life 
4. time for loved ones 
5. own physical 
appearance 
6. sexual identity 
7. secure financial 
status 
8. a long life 
9. secure employment 
10. an active lifestyle 
not at 
all 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
very, 
very 
much 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Reactance Index. Part B 
Please indicate, by circling the number that most accurately 
describes your position, how much the following options, 
options available to someone with breast cancer, would 
appeal to you, "1" being, "would not at all appeal to me," 
and "7" being, "would appeal to me very, very much." 
l=not at all 
2=very little 
3=little 
4=somewhat 
S=pretty much 
6=very much 
?=very, very much 
1. having a breast removed 
2. writing a book about your 
experience 
3. having radiation or other 
treatment 
4. giving talks to women who 
have been diagnosed as 
having breast cancer 
5. "helping out" science by 
trying out new treatments 
for breast cancer patients 
6. having follow-up surgery 
7. attending breast cancer 
patient support groups 
8. having reconstructive 
surgery 
9. sharing your experience 
with significant others 
10. working for an 
organization that does 
research on breast cancer 
not at 
all 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
very, 
very 
much 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
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Helplessness Measure. A Description 
Helplessness (Wortman & Brehm, 1975) is the near 
opposite of reactance. As such, the responses that were 
expected to follow from helplessness are the opposite of 
those that were expected to follow from reactance. The 
first is helpless feelings; again, this response was tested 
by observing the cognitive responses of subjects. The 
second is no direct efforts to restore lost freedoms; this 
response, too, was tested by inspection of MHLC scores. 
Scores for those people experiencing helplessness should 
have been lower on the internal subscale than scores for 
those people not experiencing helplessness. Third, changes 
in perceptions of the outcomes would not be expected; this 
response was tested by the index used for reactance. 
Subjects experiencing helplessness should have had lower 
scores on the first part and higher scores on the second 
part than subjects not experiencing helplessness. 
Illusion of Control Measure. A Description 
Illusion of control .(Langer, 1975) was tested by three 
expected responses. First, subjects were asked to indicate 
their perceived susceptibility of getting breast cancer. 
Subjects experiencing an illusion of control should have 
perceived themselves to be less susceptible than those 
people not experiencing an illusion of control. Second, 
subjects were asked about their beliefs in BSE's efficacy 
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(The more skill-related cues that are present in a chance 
situation, the more likely one will manifest an illusion of 
control (Langer & Roth, 1975; Wortman, 1975)); possibly, 
subjects experiencing an illusion of control should have 
paid more attention to such cues, i.e., BSE effectiveness. 
Subjects experiencing an illusion of control, then, should 
have rated BSE's efficacy higher than those subjects not 
experiencing an illusion of control. Third, subjects were 
given the following list of superstitions associated with 
breast cancer and were asked to indicate their agreement 
with the list items (Persons undergoing an illusion of 
control often maintain superstitious beliefs). Subjects 
experiencing an illusion of control then, should have had 
higher scores on the following index than subjects not 
experiencing an illusion of control. 
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Illusion of Control Index 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how much you agree 
(disagree) with the following statements. 
l=very strongly disagree 
2=strongly disagree 
3=somewhat disagree 
4=neither agree nor disagree 
5=somewhat agree 
6=strongly agree 
?=very strongly agree 
1. Amply endowed women have a much higher 
than women who are not amply endowed. 
1 2 3 4 5 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2. If I had a lump in one of my breasts, 
likely know it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
breast cancer risk 
6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
I would most 
6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
3. Women who perform breast self-exams regularly have an 
increased chance of finding a lump if one is there. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
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4. Silicone inserts, used to enlarge the breasts, can 
increase a woman's breast cancer risk. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
5. Women who have been hit or bumped on a breast have a 
greater chance of getting breast cancer than women who 
have had no such injury. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
6. Women who have their doctors show them how to perform 
breast self-exams are more likely to find a lump if one 
is there. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
7. As long I eat well and exercise regularly, I don't have 
to worry too much about getting breast cancer. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
8. If breast cancer does not run in a woman's family, she 
can feel pretty sure that she won't get it. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
9. Breast cancer is a major 
American 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
10. I'm 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
too 
women today. 
2 3 
young to worry 
2 3 
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cause of illness and death among 
4 5 6 
about getting breast 
4 5 6 
7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
cancer. 
7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
11. Women who breastfeed their children have a higher chance 
of getting breast cancer than women who do not 
breastfeed. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
12. The best way a woman can protect herself from breast 
cancer is through early detection and prompt treatment. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
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Measure of Attitudes towards BSE 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of 
the following statements, 11 1 11 being "very strongly 
disagree," and 11 7 11 being "very strongly agree." 
1. I think performing a breast self-exam is an act of 
survival. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
2. Performing breast self-exams is something I should do 
with no hesitation. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
3. I believe breast self-exams are crucial to breast cancer 
detection. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
4. I feel breast self-exams are one of many "life or death" 
health behaviors. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
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5. I feel breast self-exams are extremely important in 
promoting good health. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
6. Performing breast self-exams would make me feel 100% 
better about my health. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
7. I think the decision to perform breast self-exams is the 
smartest one a woman could make. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
8. I believe performing breast self-exams would make me feel 
a great deal safer with respect to my health. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
9. I feel performing breast self-exams is an act in which 
all women should engage. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
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10. Breast self-exams should be performed on an extremely 
regular basis. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
11. I feel I should perform breast self-exams because I know 
my body a great deal better than anyone else does. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
12. Women who 
huge risk 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 
do 
of 
2 
3 4 5 6 
not perform breast self-exams 
getting breast cancer. 
3 4 5 6 
are 
7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
taking a 
7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
13. I can't imagine not performing breast self-exams. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
14. I feel that performing breast self-exams is the best 
thing a woman could do for herself. 
1 
very 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
strongly 
agree 
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Measure of Intentions of Performing BSE 
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that 
you will perform breast self-exams in the future. 
1 
no 
likelihood 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
very great 
likelihood 
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BSE Performance Index 
Please indicate how many times since you read your pamphlet 
on breast self-exams and filled out the study questionnaire 
you performed a breast self-exam. 
How careful were you each time you performed a breast self-
exam? 
1 
not at all 
careful 
2 
not very 
careful 
3 
somewhat 
careful 
4 
very 
careful 
5 
extremely 
careful 
How thorough were you each time you performed a breast self-
exam? 
1 
not at all 
thorough 
2 
not very 
thorough 
3 
somewhat 
thorough 
4 
very 
thorough 
5 
extremely 
thorough 
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Measure of Pamphlet Impact 
la,b. Since you read the pamphlet on BSE and filled out the 
questionnaire, how much have you thought about breast 
self-exams? About breast cancer? 
not at 
all 
not very somewhat pretty 
much much 
a lot 
2a,b. Since you filled out the questionnaire, how much have 
you talked about breast self-exams? About breast 
cancer? 
not at 
all 
not very somewhat pretty 
much much 
a lot 
3a,b. Since you filled out the questionnaire, how much have 
you read about breast self-exams? About breast 
cancer? 
not at 
all 
not very somewhat pretty 
much much 
a lot 
4a,b. Since you filled out the questionnaire, how much have 
you seen in the media about breast self-exams? About 
breast cancer? 
nothing not very somewhat pretty a lot 
much much 
5a,b. How much do you think reading the pamphlet changed 
your outlook on breast self-exams? On breast cancer? 
On your health in general? 
not at 
all 
not very somewhat pretty 
much much 
a lot 
APPENDIX C 
Pamphlet Contents. Page 1: Basic Facts 
BASIC FACTS 
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Breast cancer is a major cause of illness and death 
among American women today. About one woman out of every 10 
in the United States will develop breast cancer during her 
lifetime. Until the disease can be prevented, the best way 
to protect yourself is through early detection and prompt 
treatment. The American Cancer Society recommends that all 
women perform breast self-exams (BSEs). 
It is important for you to be familiar with your own 
breasts. After you learn how your normal breast tissue 
feels, you will be able to recognize a change if one occurs. 
You will increase your ability to feel different structures 
in your breast tissue by doing a self-exam every month. 
BSE is an important part of early detection. In fact, 
most lumps are found by women themselves. The BSE 
guidelines are designed to help you feel confident in doing 
BSE each month. 
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Gain-framed. Low-Cost Message 
"What are the consequences of doing breast self-exams?" 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can prevent 
breast cancer from becoming fatal. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can know 
how your normal, healthy breasts feel. 
--By doing breast self-exams, you can take pride 
in yourself for caring about your health. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will have an 
increased chance of living a long, healthy life. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will 
probably not have to have your breasts removed 
if breast cancer is discovered. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will 
probably not find a tumor that is not treatable. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you should not 
have to worry about dying from breast cancer. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you are not 
taking a huge risk with respect to your health. 
"How much time and effort are involved?" 
--Doing breast self-exams requires only five 
minutes of your time per month. 
--Doing breast self-exams is a very simple 
procedure. 
--In doing breast self-exams, you can choose one 
of three patterns, the one that is easiest for 
you. 
--Breast self-exams can be done in a variety of 
places, e.g., in the shower, in bed, or in 
front of a mirror. 
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the 
easiest of all health behaviors. 
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Gain-framed. High-cost Message 
"What are the consequences of doing breast self-exams?" 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can prevent 
breast cancer from becoming fatal. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can know 
how your normal, healthy breasts feel. 
--By doing breast self-exams, you can take pride 
in yourself for caring about your health. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will have an 
increased chance of living a long, healthy life. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will 
probably not have to have your breasts removed 
if breast cancer is discovered. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will 
probably not find a tumor that is not treatable. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you should not 
have to worry about dying from breast cancer. 
--By doing breast self-exams now, you are not 
taking a huge risk with respect to your health. 
"How much time and effort are involved?" 
--Doing breast self-exams requires regularity 
(examine the same time each month), complete 
coverage (examine all of your breast), 
consistent pattern, use of finger pads (press 
with top third of fingers), and adequate 
pressure (massage to feel deep breast tissue). 
--In addition to doing breast self-exams every 
month, you should have a breast exam by your 
doctor at least every three years and a 
mammogram between the ages of 35 to 39. 
--In doing breast self-exams, you should 
painstakingly choose one of three patterns: the 
circular pattern, vertical strip, or the wedge. 
--Breast self-exams should be done in one or more 
of several carefully chosen places, e.g., in 
the shower, in bed, or in front of a mirror. 
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the 
most involving of all health behaviors. 
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Loss-framed. Low-cost Message 
"What are the consequences of not doing breast self 
exams?" 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot 
prevent breast cancer from becoming fatal. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot 
know how your normal, healthy breasts feel. 
--By not doing breast self-exams, you cannot take 
pride in yourself for caring about your health. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will not 
have an increased chance of living a long, 
healthy life. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will 
probably have to have your breasts removed if 
breast cancer is discovered. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may one 
day find a tumor that is not treatable. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may have 
to worry about dying from breast cancer. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you are 
taking a huge risk with respect to your health. 
"How much time and effort are involved?" 
--Doing breast self-exams requires only five 
minutes of your time per month. 
--Doing breast self-exams is a very simple 
procedure. 
--In doing breast self-exams, you can choose one 
of three patterns, the one that is easiest for 
you. 
--Breast self-exams can be done in a variety of 
places, e.g., in the shower, in bed, or in 
front of a mirror. 
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the 
easiest of all health behaviors. 
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Loss-framed. High-cost Message 
"What are the consequences of not doing breast self-
exams?" 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot 
prevent breast cancer from becoming fatal. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot 
know how your normal, healthy breasts feel. 
--By not doing breast self-exams, you cannot take 
pride in yourself for caring about your health. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will not 
have an increased chance of living a long life. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will 
probably have to have your breasts removed if 
breast cancer is discovered. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may one 
day find a tumor that is not treatable. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may have 
to worry about dying from breast cancer. 
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you are 
taking a huge risk with respect to your health. 
"How much time and effort are involved?" 
--Doing breast self-exams requires regularity 
(examine the same time each month), complete 
coverage (examine all of your breast), 
consistent pattern, use of finger pads (press 
with top third of fingers), and adequate 
pressure. 
--In addition to doing breast self-exams every 
month, you should have a breast exam by your 
doctor at least every three years and a 
mammogram between the ages of 35 to 39. 
--In doing breast self-exams, you should 
painstakingly choose one of three patterns: the 
circular pattern, vertical strip, or the wedge. 
--Breast self-exams should be done in one or more 
of several carefully chosen places, e.g., in 
the shower, in bed, or in front of a mirror. 
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the 
most involving of all health behaviors. 
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 3; How to do BSE 
HOW TO DO BSE 
1. Lie down. Flatten your right breast by placing a pillow 
under your right shoulder. If your breasts are large, use 
your right hand to hold your right breast while you do the 
exam with your left hand. 
2. Use the sensitive pads of the middle three fingers on 
your left hand. Feel for lumps using a rubbing motion. 
3. Press firmly enough to feel different breast tissues. 
4. Completely feel all of the breast and chest area to cover 
breast tissue that extends toward the shoulder. Allow 
enough time for a complete exam. 
5. Use the same pattern to feel every part of the breast 
tissue. The diagrams on the next page show the three 
patterns preferred by women and their doctors: the circular, 
clock or oval pattern, the vertical strip and the wedge. 
6. After you have completely examined your right breast, 
then examine your left breast using the same method. 
Compare what you have felt in one breast with the other. 
7. You may also want to examine your breasts while bathing, 
when your skin is wet and lumps may be easier to feel. 
8. You can check your breasts in a mirror looking for any 
change in size or contour, dimpling of the skin or 
spontaneous nipple discharge. 
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Pamphlet Contents, Page 4: How to do BSE, cont'd. 
Your monthly BSE should be carried out when your 
breasts are likely to be the least lumpy. If you have a 
regular menstrual cycle, you should examine your breasts at 
the end of your menstrual period. If you do not have 
menstrual periods, BSE should be done on the same day of 
every month. 
If you notice any changes, see your doctor without 
delay. Take the opportunity whenever you see your doctor to 
discuss how to do BSE and what you feel when you do self-
exams. Ask if you are doing BSE correctly and for comments 
to improve your BSE skills. 
Remember, the best means of controlling breast cancer 
is by finding it early. Talk with your doctor. As 
partners, you will want to share information and you'll want 
to request advice on where to go to have a mammogram and how 
often you need to have the exams done. 
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